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A.  PURPOSE 
After the Rwandan genocide, which occurred between April and July 1994, 
Rwanda was a totally destroyed country. The painful legacies of that tragedy are a 
million people dead, legions of traumatized survivors, shattered social structures, and 
thousands of suspects in prison. 
This situation poses tough challenges for the Government of Rwanda. First, in 
order to bring peace, stability and harmony, justice must be done. This is difficult 
because there is an acute shortage of legal staff either because they were killed, or 
because they are now in prison or in exile. 
Initially, many Rwandans placed their hopes in the well-funded International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) but it has been plagued by inefficiencies and 
delays. Although the Rwandan national courts have tried a significantly larger number of 
cases than the ICTR, they are also criticized as being too slow. Therefore, the 
government of Rwanda has proposed using the “Gacaca” traditional courts to accelerate 
post-genocide justice.  The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether, and under what 
conditions, the Gacaca courts can be an effective mechanism of justice and national 
reconciliation. Gacaca is a system that enlists the communities to prosecute, deliberate 
and enforce decisions. This aspect of ownership is the strength and success of Gacaca 
jurisdictions, one that will help to rebuild Rwanda’s shattered social structure. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
It has been widely argued that past ethnic and political divisions and oppression in 
South Africa and Rwanda were the root causes of the gross human rights violations 
experienced in these countries. In Rwanda, however, there is little evidence of wide- 
ranging ethnic conflict in pre-colonial times, but rather a deliberate cultivation by Belgian 
colonial rulers of an elite Tutsi group at the expense of Hutus. This resulted in a pattern in 
Rwandan public life in which superficial physical and cultural differences were 
accentuated for political gains. Rwandans to this day suffer the consequences. The  
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genocide in Rwanda in 1994, in which up to one million mainly Tutsis and moderate 
Hutus were killed in 100 days, was one of the most devastating acts of genocide since the 
Holocaust. 
Ten years after the genocide, Rwanda is faced with a range of complex 
challenges. Most pressing among these, are the twin challenges of putting on trial the 
sheer numbers of alleged perpetrators currently incarcerated, and the need to foster 
reconciliation and national unity on the other by eliminating the culture of impunity that 
has hitherto been part of the Rwandan experience.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
While the literature has shown that these challenges cannot be met through the 
formal judicial process alone, Rwanda has initiated a revived traditional community 
forum for dispensing justice, the Gacaca courts, but in a modified form. The main 
questions are whether these traditional courts used to deal with simple crimes can achieve 
these huge objectives. 
Should they duplicate the form of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) and forgiveness, which is believed by many as a success, or should 
the solution be more in the form of the Nuremberg Trials, which often used the death 
penalty as a form of just vengeance? One thing is certain: this topic is new, there is little 
research on it; however, there appears to be many critics of these courts and few or no 
suggested alternatives. 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze different theories related to Gacaca courts 
critically by reviewing literature on the South African TRC and other case studies, 
formulate arguments that support solutions to the Rwandan justice and reconciliation 
problems thereby allowing the choice of the best alternative.  
Mark A. Dumbl, Assistant Professor, William H. Brown School of Law, 
University of Arkansas at Little Rock, questioned the ability of these trials to achieve 
these goals and suggested that they may, in fact, aggravate ethnic identity politics and 
threaten Rwanda’s long-term stability.1 Dumbl argues that pardons are necessary to 
 
1 Mark A. Drumbl, “Punishment.  Post-Genocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda,” New 
York University Law Review. Vol. 75, 1. (November 2000). Document retrieved from 
http://Proquest.umi.com, Accessed September 2004.
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achieve stability. In taking this stand, the author forgets that crimes against humanity are 
different from other usual crimes, in that, they are not forgivable but people may be.   
Amnesty laws grant impunity and prevent accountability before the law, while 
bringing violators to justice sends a clear message to all that human rights violations will 
not be tolerated or allowed to continue.  
Prosecution is necessary to establish the rule of law. Some analysts argue that the 
prosecution of crimes of states is essential to building the strong civil society required for 
effective democratic governance.  
Luc Huyse, for example, says: “unless crimes are investigated and punished, there 
can be no real growth of trust, no implanting of democratic norms in society at large, and 
therefore no genuine consolidation of democracy.”2
Huyse’s argument holds true since prosecution is necessary to promote the rule of 
law. Equality before the law and substantive justice benefits society by guarding against 
arbitrary state actions and guaranteeing political rights. Failure to hold members of the 
former regime accountable perpetuates their feeling of impunity and may vitiate the 
authority of law itself. Justice is a necessary precursor to reconciliation: victims 
presumably are more willing to forgive, or at least tolerate, wrongdoers who have faced 
justice and paid their dues. Reducing tensions, building and promoting reconciliation are 
considered as essential for long-term stability.   
Martha Minow, in her book Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, asks a number 
of interesting questions: 
• Is it possible for individuals to heal in the wake of mass atrocities?  
• Is it meaningful even to imagine the healing of a nation riven by 
oppression, mass killings, and torture?  
• Can and should there be alternatives to traditional institutional responses?  
• Should justice or truth take precedence? 
• What value are facts without justice?3 
 
2 Luc Huyse, “Justice after Transition: On the Choices Successor Elites Make in Dealing with the 
Past,” Law & Social Inquiry, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Winter 1995), 340. 
3 Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass 
Violence, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 9. 
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Trust among people is essential for development. Nat. J. Colletta and Cullen 
assert that social cohesion can be measured by the density and nature of organization and 
networks (both vertical and horizontal) and by members’ sense of commitment and 
responsibility to these groups.”4 They understand that cohesiveness of a society was 
founded on the basis of trust, which leads to the ability for cooperation and mutual 
exchange for material, labor and information. However, this trust was lost during the 
genocide because one group killed their neighbors, destroyed their properties and 
humiliated them. 
Prosecution and repentance of the wrongdoers can begin to heal the wounds of 
those who suffered from official abuse, restore the lost sense of national dignity, and 
establish faith in the new government as it attempts to build a democratic system based 
on respect for rights and rule of law. 
In short, many diverging theories exist concerning justice in Rwanda. Some of 
these theories may have applied well elsewhere but cannot be effectively applied in 
Rwanda. However, the Gacaca courts may find some useful lessons from those theories 
or cases such as the South African TRC. On the other hand, those literatures advocating 
amnesty and not prosecution may not be helpful to Rwanda given the history and degree 
of impunity and the weight of the genocide legacy on Rwandan society. It is paramount 
to prosecute genocide perpetrators in order to cast out the culture of impunity and be able 
to foster national unity and reconciliation. 
Thus, those arguments that support prosecution associated with reconciliation and 
not pardon will be adopted. The South African TRC might provide an interesting case 
study to compare with the Gacaca courts because they share some similarities. 
D. MAJOR QUESTIONS 
1. Main Question 
• Does the Gacaca traditional courts system provide the best solution to 
post-conflict justice in Rwanda? 
  
4 Collette J. Nat and Michelle. L. Cullen, “The Nexus between Violent Conflict, Social Capital and 
Social Cohesion: Case study from Cambodia and Rwanda,” Working Paper No. 23, The World Bank Social 
Development Family Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network, Washington, D.C., 
(2000). This paper can also be viewed at http://www.worldbank.org/socialdevelopment, Accessed March 
2005. 
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2. Secondary Questions 
• Will massive trials reconcile Rwandans? 
• How might the Hutu and Tutsi communities react during the trials? 
• What obstacles must Gacaca overcome to succeed?  
• How do the Gacaca courts assert their legitimacy? 
• What can be done to maximize its potential for success? 
E. ARGUMENT 
The argument is that for decades the people of Rwanda lived in harmony, 
intermarried, had tight social networks, and never perpetrated any kind of fratricide. The 
ethnic and political massacres of 1994 were a result of contrived political machinations, 
not the result of inherent ethnic or tribal tensions. On the other hand, the International 
Tribunal on Rwanda has failed to achieve tangible results to bring justice and 
reconciliation. Also, the Rwandan national courts have also been unable to perform 
satisfactorily. Thus, the belief is that by combining lessons from the TRCs and elsewhere, 
the Rwandan Gacaca might attain their objectives. 
F. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
The methodology used in this research is as follows. First, existing literatures on 
Rwanda that depict the origin and causes of the polarization of the Rwandan people and 
their differentiation into ethnic groups are examined. Next, a review of various literatures 
written on Gacaca and on justice in other post-conflict societies follows. This thesis 
examines different Truth and Reconciliation Commissions but  dwells much on that of 
South Africa. The South African and Rwandan conflicts having some similarities, and the 
TRC may provide some inputs, especially in the areas of reconciliation. Elsewhere, the 
Sierra-Leone case may provide some inputs since Sierra Leone will prosecute the war 
criminals. Also, by combining both the TRC and the Sierra Leone case, it might be 
possible to obtain contributions for the Gacaca Model of combining prosecution and 
reconciliation.  In addition, other cases, such as the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, are 







G. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter II, Background to the Rwandan Conflict highlights the legacy of 
genocide and the perpetual impunity that existed during the post independence regimes. 
Chapter III, Challenges of Post-War Justice discusses the importance of post-war 
justice as a tool to bring closure and begin the process of national reconciliation. This 
chapter also presents the following historical examples of post-war justice: 
• Germany 
• Japan 
• South- Africa 
• Sierra-Leone 
In addition, it finally provides the lessons learnt and the implications for Rwanda. 
Chapter IV, Post-War Justice in Rwanda highlights the challenges of post-war 
justice and the slow justice in Rwanda. 
Chapter V, The Gacaca Justice System examines the background and history of 
this traditional Rwandan System. It also explores the strengths and weaknesses of 
applying the Gacaca system in today’s Rwanda. 
Chapter VI presents the conclusions. 
7 
                                                
II. BACKGROUND TO THE RWANDAN CONFLICT 
Rwanda is a landlocked country found in East Central Africa, south of the 
Equator. Before the colonial era, the people who occupied the territory of Rwanda 
developed a unique culture, language, a system of government and a traditional justice 
system called “Gacaca”. The Rwandan people engaged in a variety of economic activities 
such as agriculture, animal husbandry, pottery, iron works and others. 
Pre-colonial Rwanda was a highly centralized Kingdom presided over by Tutsi 
kings who hailed from a single ruling clan. The Mwami (king) was treated like a divine 
being, who “was regarded as a personal embodiment of Rwanda.”5 The Mwami ruled 
through three categories of chiefs: cattle, land, and military chiefs. The cattle chief or 
umutwale w’inka, ruled over the grazing lands, the land chief or umutwale w’ubutaka, 
was entrusted with the management of land resources and taxation, while the military 
chief or umutwale w’ingabo, was in charge of defensive matters including the recruitment 
of fighters for the king’s armies.6 The chiefs were predominantly, but not exclusively, 
Tutsi, especially the cattle and military chiefs. While the relationship between the king 
and the rest of the population was unequal, the relationship between the ordinary Hutu, 
Tutsi and Twa was symbiotic or one of mutual benefit mainly through the exchange of 
their labor specialties.7  A clientel system comprised of “Ubuhake” and “ubukonde” 
permeated the whole society like “a seamless web, linking men in a relationship of 
mutual dependence.”8  
Ubuhake, a clientage system based on cattle, was mainly confined in pastoral 
areas in the central, eastern and southern parts of the country. This system embodied two 
characteristics. First, the clientage system was a highly personalized relationship between 
a client and a patron, involving the exchange of certain commodities and services.  The 
obligations arising from the clientage system relationship fell evenly upon the Hutu and 
 
5 Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will be Killed with Our Families: 
Stories From Rwanda, (Farrar: Straus and Giroux, 1998), 49. 
6 Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, History of a Genocide, (Columbia University Press, 1995), 11. 
7 Jill D. Rutaremara, “Genocide in Rwanda: Towards A Theoretical Approach,” Master’s Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2000, 39. 
8 Rene Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, (Praeger Publishers, 1970), 36. 
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Tutsi.9 Second, the ubuhake clientage system involved social mobility within the 
Rwandan society. An ambitious Hutu, who was able to accumulate wealth (cattle), could 
make his way up the social ladder to be assimilated into the Tutsi caste, otherwise known 
as kwihutura, which literally means, “shedding Hutuness.”10 On the other hand, a Tutsi 
who lost cows would descend from the social ladder and would be regarded as Hutu as 
his assets shrank over time. The Twa comprised those who specialized in pottery making 
or lived off the land as hunters or gatherers, or who otherwise lived independently in 
forests.  The Twa remained generally marginalized. However, a few potters gained 
wealth by exchanging their products for milk and food, and were able to penetrate the 
upper hierarchy and become Tutsified. 
Ubukonde was a clientage system based on land. It was predominant in the 
Northwestern parts of present day Rwanda, which were mainly agricultural areas. It is 
worth noting that the economic value and the prestige that a cow represented in Rwandan 
society at that time, made ubuhake clientage more popular than ubukonde.  
It is very important to note that before colonialism, the Rwandan people identified 
themselves by their clans and not by ethnicity. The 18 clans that existed in Rwanda cut 
across the three groups. Marriage and other social interactions also bridged these groups. 
Furthermore, all clans were expected to take up arms. The Tutsi were not the only ones to 
fight, Gérard Prunier writes. “All men were part of the Intore (fighting regiments).”11  
In 1899, Rwanda became a German colony, albeit the German colonial presence 
was very limited. The Germans practiced indirect rule, through the Mwami. In 1919, 
Rwanda became a mandate territory of the League of Nations under Belgian 
administration.12 Thus, the Belgians inherited a colony that was one of the few African 
countries in which the indigenous people spoke the same language, shared the same 
culture, intermarried, belonged to the same clans and were commingled in the same 
geographical territory. Prior to this colonial era, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa coexisted and 
showed no predisposition towards conflict. 
 
9 Rene Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, (Praeger Publishers, 1970), 37. 
10 Ibid., 39 
11 Prunier, 14. 
12 Ibid., 26. 
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While the German rule in Rwanda had little or no impact, the Belgians introduced 
policies that ultimately proved to be socially divisive. These included the following: 
• Politics of ethnic divisions  
• Forced labor, 
• Deportations and massive expulsions of populations, 
• Persecutions, 
• Attacks against civilian populations, 
• Assassinations, 
• Mass killings. 
A. DIVIDE AND RULE POLICY 
The Germans, and later the Belgians, advanced theories about the separate origins 
of Tutsi and Hutu, based on racial theories developed in the 19th century. They measured 
physical body parts and catalogued allegedly different physical characteristics of the 
three groups. They taught their theories in schools, and based administrative policies on 
them. Jean Paul Harroy, the resident governor of Rwanda and Burundi (from 1955 to 
1962), wrote:  
Gifted with a vivacious intelligence, the Tutsi displays a refinement of 
feelings, which is rare among primitive people. He is a natural borne 
leader, capable of extreme self-control and of calculated good will.13
This type of impression passed for informed scientific canon, which governed the 
decisions made by the Germans and even more so by the Belgian colonial authorities.14 
More importantly, it had a destructive impact on traditional Rwandan society and social 
structure. It created a false superiority complex among Tutsi. The Hutu were portrayed as 
an inferior servile group. They were the true black Africans and considered unfit to be in 
any positions of leadership. Some schools separated Tutsi and Hutu, a segregation that 
continued in the workplace. “A dangerous social bomb was almost absent mindedly 
manufactured through the peaceful years of abazungu (whites) domination,15” Prunier 
writes. Identity cards, introduced in 1932, stated one’s ethnicity, thus fixing a person in a 
 
13 Prunier, p. 16, as quoted in Jean P. Harory, Le Rwanda de la Feodalité à la Democratie (1955-
1962), (Brussels: Hayez 1984). 
14 Prunier, 9. 
15 Ibid. 
10 
social caste from which there was no escape. This allowed the colonialists to differentiate 
Tutsi from the rest (Hutu, Twa ) for the purpose of administration rule. Not only did this 
official distinction sow the seeds of hatred between Hutus toward Tutsis, but it also 
curtailed traditional social and economic mobility. 
 
Table 1. The Astrida (now Butare) College Enrolment Breakdown by Ethnic Origin. 
(From: René Lemarchand, Chapter 4). 
 
Year Tutsi Pupils Hutu Pupils 
1932 45 9 
1945 46 3 
1954 63 19 (incl. 13 from Burundi) 
1959 279 143 
 
Later, when the anti-colonial wave moved across Africa and the Tutsi led the 
demands for independence, both the Belgian colonial administration and the church 
turned against them. They promoted a Hutu elite to counter the Tutsi. According to 
Prunier, this was brought about by “the combination of changes in white clerical 
sympathies, struggle for the control of the Rwandese church, and increased challenges of 
the colonial order by the Tutsi elite.”16 The Belgian approach toward Rwanda and the 
ethnic politics practiced in Belgium, where “the Francophone Wallon minority had for 
centuries dominated the Flemish majority.”17  After the Second World War, when the 
Flemish had gained power, the Flemish priests replaced the Wallon priests in Rwanda. 
These Flemish priests identified with the Hutu and encouraged their aspirations for 
political change.18  
The violence began with the 1959 coup d’état, in which the monarchy was 
abolished by both the Belgians and the Hutu elite following the mysterious death of 
Mwami Rudahigwa. The king was rumored to have been assassinated by his Belgian 
                                                 
16 Prunier, 43. 
17 Gourevitch, 58. 
18 Ibid. 
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Physician in Bujumbura in August 1959 by lethal injection. Ethnic propaganda about the 
Tutsi oppression against Hutu was circulated widely with official approval and Belgians 
helped to organize what they called the Hutu Social Revolution of 1959. In short, they 
turned against the Tutsi and selected the Hutu as their new partners. The Tutsi were 
punished through killings, expulsions, detentions, destruction of property and other forms 
of crimes against them. These policies were continued by the post independence 
administration and culminated in the 1994 genocide.  
B. FORCED LABOR 
The Belgian colonial administration introduced Ubuletwa, a forced labor system, 
in cash crop production, road construction, mining and other public works. As Newbury 
comments:  
Not only was ubuletwa generalized where it did not exist before, but its 
functioning was also radically altered. Where the royal chief had dealt 
globally with whole lineages on a hill, the white administration now 
considered it an individual obligation, meaning that a family could no 
longer delegate a strong young good-for-nothing to sweat for all its 
members but that every single male (and even at times, when needed, 
women and children too) had to go and perform the corvée. 
Rwandans now had less time to grow food crops or perform activities that 
traditionally provided them a living. According to Prunier, this forced labor “could 
swallow up to 50-60% of a man’s time.”19 No salary was paid to them. The traditional 
chiefs were required to enforce this policy.  
Nothing so vividly defined the divide as Belgian regime of forced labor, 
which required armies of Hutu to toil en masse as plantation chattel, on 
road construction, and in forestry crews, and placed Tutsi over them as 
taskmasters.20
Defaulters were stripped and flogged in public, sometimes in front of their 
children and wives, which was taboo. This degrading treatment was not only a war crime 
according to Articles 4(e) of ICTR statute21 and Art 8 of ICC statute22 in modern day 
 
19 Prunier, 35. 
20 Gourevitch, 57. 
21 “Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.” Article 4: Violations of Article 3 
Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, Available from 
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html, Accessed December 2004. 
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Rwanda, but it also created discord among the ethnic groups in Rwanda, as Tutsi chiefs 
who collaborated in this system were viewed by the Hutu as representing the Tutsi who 
oppressed the Hutu. The Belgians and Hutu extremist politicians sowed ethnic discord 
and eventually prepared the conditions for the 1994 genocide who later used this in 
propaganda and literature. 
C. DEPORTATIONS AND MASSIVE EXPULSIONS OF PEOPLE 
To implement colonial policies, the Belgian colonial administrators started a 
policy of the deportation of people, political leaders and others who opposed their 
policies. In 1931, the Belgians and the Church deported Mwami Yuhi V Musinga to 
Moba in the then Belgian Congo, for being too independent23. This culminated in the 
mass forced exile of entire ethnic populations of Tutsi reaching a climax in 1959 and 
1960. The Tutsi were forced into exile in neighboring countries and in the internally 
displaced people camps (IDPCs), where they were subjected to Tsetse flies that cause 
sleeping sickness. By the time of the proclamation of independence in 1962, the number 
of refugees or displaced persons was already estimated at 300,000, of whom 120,000 
were outside the country 24. This act constituted a crime under crimes against humanity, 
under Articles 3(d) of ICTR statute25 and 7(1) of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
statute26 in modern day Rwanda. 
D. PERSECUTIONS 
A culture of persecution, the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental 
rights to certain ethnic groups was introduced during colonial rule. This persecution was 
reflected in political, racial, ethnic, and religious settings. The result was a mass exodus  
 
22 “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” Article 8: War Crimes, Available from 
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm, Accessed December 2004. 
23 Prunier, 30. 
24 Charles Villa–Vicencio and Tyrone Savage, Rwanda and South Africa in Dialogue, Addressing the 
Legacies of Genocide and Crime against Humanity, (University of Cape Town Press, 2000), 31. 
25 “Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.” Article 8:  War Crimes, Available 
from http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html, Accessed December 2004. 
26 “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” Article 7: Crimes against Humanity. Available 
from http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm, Accessed December 2004. 
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of Tutsi to neighboring countries. Starting in early 1960, some 130,000 Rwandan Tutsi 
were eventually forced to the Belgian Congo, Burundi, Tanganyika (now Tanzania) and 
Uganda, where they joined those already in exile.27
E. ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIAN POPULATION 
These actions constitute some of the worst war crimes and are prohibited under 
the Law of War as stipulated in the 1949 Geneva Convention. The worst attacks against 
civilian populations during the colonial rule occurred in 1959-60 when the colonial 
administration used the Congolese soldiers, with the support of Belgian helicopters, to 
attack Tutsi populations countrywide.  
They forced the Tutsi to leave Rwanda saying that they would not be safe 
from the Hutu who were allegedly angry because of the Tutsi exploitation 
and oppression, which entrenched a culture of war crimes that 
characterized Rwanda.28
F. ASSASSINATIONS  
King Mutara Rudahigwa’s death in 1959 paved the way for assassinations and 
mass murders in Rwanda. In 1959, 8, 000 Tutsi were brutally killed, marking the 
beginning of genocide in Rwanda. By 1962, 22,000 Tutsi had been murdered, and another 
10,000 Tutsis were slaughtered from December 1963 to January 1964 - including every 
single Tutsi politician living in Rwanda.29 These events did not attract international 
reaction, except from two Nobel Prize winners Bertrand Russel and Jean-Paul Sartre who 
described the killings as the most horrible and systematic massacres the world had 
witnessed since the Jewish genocide by the Nazis.30      
G. MASS KILLINGS 
The destructive development that spanned from 1959 to 1961 became known as 
the 1959 Hutu Revolution.  It led to the abolition of the monarchy and the removal of all 
political/administrative Tutsi structures. Between March 1961 and November 1966, some 
of the leaders of the exiled refugee groups launched a number of attacks against Rwanda. 
The attacks of these groups, known as Inyenzi (cockroaches), were used as a pretext by 
 
27 Prunier, 51. 
28 Villa–Vicencio and Savage, 32. 
29 Prunier, 56. 
30 Ibid. 
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the regime to launch indiscriminate reprisals against Tutsis inside Rwanda. President 
Kayibanda (the first President of Rwanda from 1962 to 1973) launched an anti-Tutsi 
campaign that included a series of arrests and executions. An intensive campaign, 
through speeches by leaders, radio transmissions and even popular songs was executed at 
this time. The propaganda claimed that the Tutsis were foreigners who had conquered the 
Hutu people and subjugated them to serfdom for four centuries. To ensure effective Tutsi 
exclusion from army, civil service and education, identity cards were retained.  The 
chances for national unity waned as the regime continued to propagate the old racial 
theories using them against the Tutsi to enflame ethnic antagonism.31 Faced with political 
divisions in the regime and growing discontent among the population, in July 1968, the 
National Assembly decided to establish a Parliamentary Investigating Commission. The 
commission traveled throughout the country to gather public views about the state of the 
country. The commission produced a substantial report that reflected public 
disappointment in the Kayibanda regime: 
National harmony, confidence, solidarity, collaboration, patriotism have 
lost their value and no longer exist. In their place, it is disparagement, 
hatred, egoism, antagonism, dishonesty, and hunt for money, anarchy and 
regionalism. The masses complain that leaders lied to them by telling them 
that their revolution was going to liberate them from injustice. They now 
realize that it is a way of securing posts. Once these posts are acquired, the 
injustice becomes worse than ever before. The popular masses are not 
afraid of stating that the former regime of regime of investigating the 
Chiefs with office was more preferable to the current electoral system 
because with the latter, those who deserve to be elected are aside and those 
who do not deserve are designated as candidates.32
Mass killings continued unabated in Rwanda climaxing in the 1994 genocide. In 
both post-independence regimes, Tutsi were continuously used as scapegoats for any 
failure. They used the return of Tutsi refugees as a scare tactic to play to Hutu fears for 
their physical security on the premise that their land would be confiscated or redistributed 
to returning Tutsi. In spite of these tensions, Tutsi and Hutu continued to live together, to 
work together, to intermarry, and to socialize. 
 
31 Omaar Rakya and Alex de Vaal, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, (London, UK: African 
Rights, 1995), 12. 
32 Phillip Reyntjens, Pouvoir et Droit au Rwanda, as quoted in Villa–Vicencio and Savage, 32. 
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In 1990, the Rwandan refugees, under the umbrella of the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) and its military wing the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) after several 
unsuccessful diplomatic attempts, launched an armed struggle against the regime of 
Habyarimana from Uganda. The regime reacted by killing the Tutsi, and imprisoning 
both the Tutsi and some of the Hutu. Some Hutu elite, both in and outside the mainstream 
of political power, also launched anti-Tutsi propaganda and openly called for the 
extermination of the Tutsi. This propaganda was being conducted as political negotiations 
between the RPF and the governments were on going. 
In August 1993, the two parties signed the Arusha Peace Agreement, which was 
supposed to be followed by a Broad Based Transitional Government of National Unity 
(BBGT) comprised of the ruling party-Movement Revolutionaire National Democratique 
(MRND), the RPF, and the opposition parties. The agreement entailed Power Sharing, 
Integration of the Armed Forces and the Rule of Law, among others. On the surface, the 
parties to the negotiations seemed to be successful in paving a way for a stable Rwanda, 
but “underneath they were quite fearful of the future because the extremists were 
venomously opposed to the accords.”33  This worry was concretized by President 
Habyarimana when, three months after he signed the Arusha accords, he called them “a 
scrap of paper.”34  According to Prunier, Habyarimana himself signed the agreement as a 
tactical move calculated to buy time, shore up the contradictions of the various segments 
of the opposition, and look good in the eyes of the foreign donors.”35  
At the same time, the United Nations deployed its peacekeepers, United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) under chapter VI, to assist in the 
implementation of the accords. Brigadier General Romeo Dallaire from Canada led the 
force.  
In the meantime, extremist Hutu organized violent demonstrations nationwide 
intended to undermine the accords. The killing of Tutsi and the leaders of opposition 
continued. At the end of 1993, Minister Gatabazi Felicien, who hailed from the  
33 Mohamed Abdul Latif, “Genocide in Rwanda: The Interplay of Human Capital, Scarce Resources 
and Social Cohesion,” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2003, 19. 
34 Jill D. Rutaremara, “Genocide in Rwanda: Towards A Theoretical Approach,” Master’s Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2000, 87. 
35 Prunier, 194. 
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opposition, wrote to General Dallaire warning him that a dangerous conflict was brewing 
within Rwanda,36 a view reinforced by intelligence reports. Some moderate members of 
the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) also sent letters to Dallaire informing him of 
deliberate plans of pushing the RPF into breaking the cease fire so as to justify the 
resumption of hostilities.37 In addition, an extremist Radio known as Radio Television 
Libre des Mille collines (RTLM) was licensed by the government at this time and it 
started broadcasting daily calls to violence against Tutsi and dissidents.38 It was apparent 
that the implementation of the Arusha Accords posed a threat to the Habyarimana 
government as well as to some elites from the two ruling extremist parties.  The 
Movement Revolutionaire National Democratique (MRND) and the Coalition pour la 
Defence de la Democracie (CDR), which formed the coalition of the ruling government, 
did not want to share power despite the agreement.  
Thus, before the peace agreement could be implemented, on April 6, 1994, 
President Habyarimana was mysteriously killed when his plane was shot down as it tried 
to land at the Kanombe International Airport in Kigali, the capital city of Rwanda. On 
that day, the genocide started. The RPF appealed to the interim government to stop the 
massacres, and when the government refused to comply, the RPA pushed to stop the 
massacres and overthrow the regime. The new genocidal regime that came into power 
after the death of President Habyarimana was finally defeated in July 1994 when the RPA 
forces overrun the whole country. However, by this time, the genocide had already 
claimed more that a million Tutsi and moderate Hutu lives.  
Various scholars have investigated the origins of the genocide and the reasons for 
its intensity. Some emphasize the role of Belgian colonizers and the Catholic Church in 
fomenting ethnic conflict and in sowing racial ideology, the manipulation of the 
Rwandan elites in exploiting that ideology for their own ends, and the vulnerability of 
peasants to such manipulation because of their ignorance and poverty.39 There was a 
predisposition towards genocide by some of the Hutu extremists and that predisposition 
 
36 Latif, 32. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 29. 
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grew as the threat to their power increased. By eliminating the Tutsi, the Hutu extremists  
hoped to achieve their extermination campaign, deny the RPF support, and in the process, 
make it politically and militarily weak. The main goals of the Hutu extremists were to 
exterminate Tutsi and to stay in power. 
Rutaremara further argues that the masses responded to the elite mobilization for 
two reasons. First, there was among the peasants an urge to grab land and the fear of 
losing it to the returnees.40 This urge and fear were aggravated by the extremists, and 
because land is a scarce resource in Rwanda. In addition, there was concern for physical 
security among many Hutu. There was fear of revenge by the Tutsi for various massacres 
committed by the Hutu against the Tutsi since 1959. This fear was also intensified by 
propaganda aimed at demonizing the Tutsi.  
H. CONCLUSION 
The pre-colonial Rwandan society was characterized by the homogeneity and 
unity of all Rwandans. When the colonialists came in, they divided the Rwandans and 
created ethnic groups that paved the road to future atrocities. They favored Tutsi so as to 
exploit them for their indirect rule. This situation eventually culminated into hatred 
between Hutu and Tutsi. Since prejudice, ignorance and a lack of education failed to arm 
them to resist these blandishments, many Hutu regarded Tutsi as their exploiters and not 
the colonialists. The Belgian authorities also granted independence to Rwandans in a 
precarious period, after they had abolished the monarchy, initiated and supervised the 
massacres of Tutsi as well as their forceful exile. 
Rwandan leaders who succeeded in the post-independence era also kept the same 
segregation policies. Massacres of Tutsi continued unabated up to the climate of the 1994 
genocide. The late president Habyarimana regime, using the state machinery, prepared 
and, exploited the prevailing bad economic situation, incited the Hutu to participate in 
genocide. Some Hutu pushed by a desire for rewards by fear and encouraged by a culture 
of impunity, responded massively. The genocide was characterized by a rare intensity, 
cruelty and speed. Within three months, more than a million people, mainly Tutsi and 
moderate Hutu, were killed. 
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III. CHALLENGES OF POST-WAR JUSTICE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Problems resulting from any conflict take on different patterns and dimensions 
that flow from the nature and magnitude of that conflict. Protracted conflicts such as the 
apartheid in South Africa or the violent and cruel World War leave profound 
consequences. Wherever mass violence occurs and affects people, transitional justice - 
the processes by which a state seeks to redress the violations of a prior regime - becomes 
imperative to repair injuries suffered by individuals and communities.  People responsible 
for the mass killings must be brought to justice to enable the society live on. Only when 
this is done, can a sense of national unity be created or restored, and the impulses towards 
vengeance be controlled. However, devastated judiciaries and post-conflict weak 
democracies may find it very difficult to provide the justice. Local institutions may be 
unable to organize trials or regimes that directed the mass terror may still have a say in 
the system. This chapter will analyze the importance of post-war justice and 
reconciliation through an examination of the two main components of the justice process: 
prosecutions for crimes against humanity and truth telling. It will draw on historical cases 
such as the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crime trials and the more recent Truth and 
Reconciliation Committees in South Africa and Sierra Leone to highlight any lessons 
learned. 
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF POST-WAR JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION 
Unless there is law, and unless there is an impartial tribunal to administer 
the law, no man can be really free. 
       Senator Robert Taft41
In countries emerging from a prolonged conflict where human rights have been 
seriously violated, victors and survivors may put intense pressure on new regimes to 
prosecute those responsible for causing the sufferings. In this way, a distinct demarcation 
between the old and new government can be drawn. This political pressure for victor’s 
justice may also lead to new terms such as “denazification” in the case of Germany or 
 
41 Donald D. Enholm, “Robert Taft and Nuremberg: The Verdict of Time,” Communication Studies, 
Vol. 51, (West Lafayette, Spring 2000), 35. 
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“defascistization” as in Italy, meaning a society will be purged by removing elements 
who served the repressive regime. However, if handled improperly, as Neil J. Kritz 
cautions in The Dilemmas of Transitional Justice, such action may deepen rather than 
heal the divisions within the nation. He cites the trial and execution of former dictator 
Nicolae Ceausescu following the immediate fall of his government in Romania as an 
example, which created indignation among both nationals and international community.42
Thus justice can take different forms depending on the choices of the affected 
people, the degree of their suffering, and the weight of the crime and other realities.  
Some people advocate a retributive type of justice while others prefer the restorative 
model of justice. A restorative justice as Harrell puts it, emphasizes local forums, popular 
participation, deliberative rather than adversial procedures and penalties that have a 
restitutional component43. The bottom line in this model is the preservation of the 
cohesion of the society. The retributive form of justice is the formal prosecution, which 
imposes a penalty or injury for a violation. Whatever form is the choice, they all desire to 
achieve common objectives:  
• The elimination of impunity for the past human rights violations. Impunity 
results from tolerating crimes. When a crime is committed and there is no 
accountability or punishment imposed upon culprits. For example in 
Rwanda, genocide started as early as 1959 with the killing of Tutsi, 
continued unabated in 1966, 1973 up to the climax of 1994.44 During this 
time, the Hutu community never realized it was a crime to kill the Tutsi 
because authorities never disapproved killing Tutsi. In this case, justice 
would restore the moral order by eradicating the culture of impunity that 
has subjected the country to brutal cycles of violence. 
• The importance of justice to deter future human rights violations.  By 
prosecuting and punishing the perpetrators, justice gives a warning that 
future infractions will face the full force of the law. 
• The importance of rehabilitating the criminals. The latter are first of all 
human beings; therefore they possess rights like everyone else. These 
individuals need to be educated to understand the wrong they caused to 
their victims, to society, and to themselves. They need to be prepared to 
                                                 
42 Neil J. Kritz, Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, 
(Washington, US Institute of Peace, 1995), xxi. 
43 Peter E. Harrell, Rwanda’s Gamble Gacaca and A New Model of Transitional Justice, (NY, Writers 
Club Press, 2003), 85. 
44 Prunier, 37. 
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rejoin society when they complete their punishment because if not 
rehabilitated, they are likely to commit same crimes again in the future. 
• Reconcile and rebuild society through justice.  War kills not only people 
but it also eliminates social networks. These networks take time to 
reconstitute, especially in a society that has experienced genocide or 
holocaust. In Rwanda for example, neighbors killed neighbors, friends 
killed friends, and traders killed partners, and so on. Thus, it is only when 
the perpetrators face justice, tell the truth to the survivors, and even ask 
forgiveness that a process of reconciliation can begin.  Relationships must 
be restored so that the society can begin to rebuild. 
• Establish a clear and public separation between the old regime and the 
new government. Citizens have to realize the difference between the 
“ancient regime” and the new one so as to give it legitimacy.  
• In dealing with human abuses, different countries choose different forms 
of justice.  There are some nations that opt for a retributive form or trials 
to prosecute perpetrators from the past such as the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Trials, or restorative justice such as the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Rather than punitive justice measures 
which punish, restorative processes strive to create peace in communities 
by reconciling the parties and repairing injuries caused by the conflict.  
Others might decide to mix TRCs and war crime trials like in Sierra 
Leone. The next section will look at the first option dealing with the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials and their post-war contributions. 
C. THE NUREMBERG AND TOKYO TRIALS 
International military tribunals were instituted by the victorious powers of the 
WWII to prosecute the war criminals. Though these tribunals were established in several 
places under the superpowers’ occupation, two of them, one in Nuremberg in Germany 
and another in Tokyo –Japan, became historic by trying those with most responsibilities 
in war crimes. This section will first discuss the challenges faced by the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo trials and will conclude by giving their contributions in the stabilization of those 
nations. 
1. Nuremberg Trials 
The World War II, initiated by the Axis powers comprising of Germany, Italy and 
Japan striving for regional supremacy, reached unprecedented dimensions of destruction 
and brutality. The brutality characterized by the German military’s treatment of the 
population of the occupied countries; its bid to exterminate the Jews, Gypsies and Slavs 
was beyond comprehension. Despite, the incompatible ideologies, the Soviet Union on 
one hand with communism, and the United States, Britain and France on the other with 
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democratic capitalism, forged an alliance and managed to defeat the Axis powers after six 
years of mayhem. This victory however was, achieved at a terrible human loss of 17 
million soldiers and 34 million civilians, along with material and cultural losses including 
destruction of art treasures, which were beyond calculation.45  The allied powers, after a 
series of declarations, which had started before the war ended, signed the London 
Agreement of 1945.46  This declaration marked the birth of the International Military 
Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg and Tokyo. For the first time in modern era, crimes 
recognized by the international community, were going to be enforced through an 
international penal process. 
However, considerable disagreements characterized these trials right from the 
outset, mainly pertaining to their basic purpose. For example, the British initially favored 
summary execution of major war criminals, while the Soviets advocated a special 
international tribunal for prosecuting Hitler, his close advisors and military leaders. The 
Americans and French wanted the tribunal a record history, educate the world, and serve 
as a future deterrent.  
The drafting of the Nuremberg Charter was further complicated by the difference 
in national criminal procedures of the four allies. Their conceptual differences were never 
reconciled, but they eventually agreed upon the need to convict senior Nazi officials. 
They also sought to reconcile their different legal systems through a mixed process. The 
Nuremberg Charter eventually classified, in its article 6, the indictments into three 
categories of crimes set out in the IMT:47
• Crimes against peace 
• War crimes and crimes against humanity 
• Persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds. 
The first category of crimes against peace included participation in the planning, 
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression. The second category however, 
did not make a clear distinction between war crimes and crimes against humanity, as war 
crimes were defined to include murder or mistreatment of civilian population as well as 
 
45 Prunier, 78. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., 79. 
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prisoners of war.48 The mass murder of Jews is found in the third category. However, 
many people, including very distinguished American lawyers, criticized these trials. They 
regarded the proceedings at Nuremberg as political “show trials”.  For example, Harlan 
Fiske Stone, the chief justice of the United States Supreme Court, refused to take part in a 
swearing-in ceremony for the US-appointed judges to the IMT.49
The choice of Nuremberg site for trial was made on symbolic reasons. The name 
“Nuremberg” symbolized the Third Reich itself. It is in this very town that Nazis staged 
annual rallies and there that they promulgated the notorious Nuremberg Laws of 1935, 
which stripped off German Jews of citizenship and made marriage or sexual relations 
between Jews and Germans a criminal offense. 50 In short, the city symbolized the moral 
disintegration of Germany under the Nazis. Thus, this choice of this venue was calculated 
to send a positive signal that the past traumatic regime was over and that a new one that 
guaranteed human rights was born. The IMT was hastily convened in Nuremberg in 
November of 1945 for the trial of twenty-four defendants.  
After a full year, the tribunal pronounced its verdicts, which included eleven death 
sentences and three acquittals.51 After the first round of indictments, the United States 
pursued a notably lenient policy toward Nazi prisoners. A large part of the reason for this 
was that, with the advent of Cold War tensions, American authorities were anxious to 
conciliate German opinion. The United States, together with Great Britain, had 
earmarked Germany as a future ally in the wider scheme to contain communism. 
2. The Tokyo Tribunal 
After the unconditional surrender of Japan, General Douglas Mac Arthur was 
entrusted to oversee all the occupational matters. Thus, on 19 January 1946, in his 
capacity as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) for the Pacific 
Theater, General Mac Arthur unilaterally established the International Military Tribunal 
 
48 Jeremy A. Rabkin, “Nuremberg Misremembered.” Available from 
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49 Ibid. 
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51 Rabkin, 2. 
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for the Far East or Tokyo Tribunal, through a military order.52 Though structured on the 
Nuremberg model, the Tokyo Tribunal was different from an ordinary criminal court, as 
well as the Nuremberg Tribunal. It is argued that the Tokyo Tribunal was similar to a 
military commission or a court-martial. This tribunal tried only “Class A” war criminals 
of planners and perpetrators. 
While the Nuremberg trials took one year, the Tokyo tribunal lasted for thirty-one 
months. The consequence of this length was the public ennui on the issue of crimes and 
war responsibilities. The Tokyo tribunal was widely criticized as being victors’ 
vengeance. According to U.S. Brigadier General Elliot Thorpe (who decided which high–
ranking Japanese should be arrested as war criminals), “’Class A’ trials were 
fundamentally an exercise in revenge. We wanted blood and, by God, we had blood.”53  
The Tokyo tribunal failed to provide an official publication of proceedings, unlike the 
Nuremberg Trials where court records were available in a forty-two-volume publication. 
The court proceedings at Tokyo were also characterized by egregious procedural 
irregularities: the defendants were chosen on the basis of political criteria and their trials 
were generally unfair. “The execution of sentences was also inconsistent, controlled by 
the political whims of General Mac Arthur, who had the power to grant clemency, reduce 
sentences, and release convicted war criminals on parole.”54
In Japan, as in Germany, the United States increasingly became preoccupied with 
the post-war politics rather than justice. American leaders did not wish a political vacuum 
to form that would create an opportunity for communism to proliferate. Thus, the prime 
force behind the Tokyo Tribunal was the future of an Asian policy based on maintaining 
Japan’s stability and strength. So the United States had to make sure that the Japanese did 
not feel humiliated by the consequences of the World War II. Hence, on 3 February 1950, 
General Mac Arthur reportedly decided to not prosecute Emperor Hirohito of Japan as a 
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war criminal. He felt that prosecuting the emperor would make the pacification of Japan a 
much more difficult task, costing the United States at the hands of Japan guerrillas.55
D. CONTRIBUTIONS  
The Nuremberg trials’ objectives were meant to serve two ends: to render justice 
for all victims of Nazi aggression, and to educate the world about the unprecedented 
crimes of the third Reich. Many considered the Nuremberg Trials a great success despite 
the tensions caused by the different legal systems among four allies, the challenges of 
unknown types of crimes, the constraint of time, and the tension caused by two diverging 
aims: educating and prosecuting. The Nuremberg Trials not only produced a historical 
record of Nazism but also exacted justice. This feat was accomplished without 
disfiguring or defaming the law in the process. Many people including the Germans 
themselves believe that the trials at Nuremberg began a process of transformation. The 
association of that place and the crimes symbolized how justice can transform horror into 
hope. Furthermore, other people such as Smith have argued that “ the deliberations 
associated with the Nuremberg trial may well have forestalled a bloodbath.”56 These 
trials indeed averted revenge acts that were expected given the degree of cruelty the 
Germans inflicted to the Jews and other population under German occupation in Europe 
during the WWII. 
Another important legacy of the Nuremberg trials is international criminal law. It 
is on this model that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and 
the International Criminal Tribunal Court for Rwanda were founded. 
In sum, apart from those unavoidable imperfections that characterized both the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials due to the diverging interests of the nations involved, those 
two tribunals were largely successful. They were punctual and managed to come to terms 
with the horrific events, achieved closure, and helped to rebuild healthy and stable 
societies. These trials were justified on the grounds that individual criminal 
accountability promotes reconciliation. Consequently, they served to highlight the moral 
claim that individuals and not groups are responsible for acts of violence. These tribunals  
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also demonstrated that the protection of human rights was too important to be left to the 
individual states where the transgressions occurred. Finally, these tribunals created legal 
precedents that outlawed wars of aggression, war crimes against humanity. 
E. JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
When Apartheid was abolished in South Africa in 1994, the majority black South 
African felt relieved.  They hoped that justice will be provided and will help their 
sufferings to heal.  However their first disappointment was in the creation of the TRC, 
which advocated for forgiveness and a form of amnesty instead of prosecution. People 
were expecting those who violated their rights to be punished.  This section will analyze 
the challenges faced this new form of justice and its achievements. 
The majority of South Africans were excluded from participating in the political 
and economical life of their nation for almost 350 years. Successive constitutions were 
used as instruments to consolidate white hegemony, excluding the vast majority of the 
population in terms of the color of the skin.57 This system of apartheid, which was later 
declared a crime against humanity by the international community, did not only ensure 
privilege for a few, but also attempted to dehumanize from “cradle to grave” those 
excluded from such privilege. In 1994, South Africa achieved political liberation, with a 
changeover of government from the white minority to the black majority. It also marked 
the abolition of apartheid, and a year later, the South African parliament established the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The objective of the TRC 
was to address the legacy of the past by promoting national unity and reconciliation that 
would contribute to the healing of the nation. 
It is worthwhile noting the context in which the South African TRC was created 
in order to understand why the South Africans opted for a restorative form of justice and 
not a retributive type like in the Nuremberg case58. Below are a few of the major factors 
that necessitated the two parties ( the white and black communities) to compromise. 
• A stalemate was reached (an equilibrium in the balance of forces) with 
neither side an outright victor 
• A negotiated settlement ensued - not a revolutionary takeover 
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• A fragile democracy and a precarious national unity 
• The capacity of the outgoing regime, including the military and security 
forces that commanded huge resources, to delay or derail the process or at 
the very least, support and promote resistance to change. 
Initially, the former government, supported by the international community, was 
calling for a blanket amnesty for all protagonists in the conflict of the past. But this was 
strongly opposed by the African National Congress (ANC). The debate was centered in 
two camps.  The first camp consisted of the victims of violations who demanded that 
alleged crimes be avenged, while the second camp was made up of perpetrators seeking 
impunity by a way of blanket amnesty. 
F. HOW DOES THE TRC PROCESS FUNCTION? 
We have taken the concept of justice in its broadest sense and found a formulation 
that meets the specific requirements of our country-a formulation that contains a strong 
element of restorative justice, while limiting retribution to public exposure and shame to 
be faced by the perpetrators, whose names and deeds are becoming known: Former South 
African Minster of Transport, Mac Maharaj.59  
The TRC consists of three components, namely, The Amnesty Committee, The 
Human Rights Violations Committee, and The Reparations and Rehabilitations 
Committee. The Amnesty component works on the basis of a perpetrator-driven incentive 
of being given amnesty in return for full and truthful public acknowledgement of all the 
committed crimes. The bottom line is that the perpetrators must personally apply for 
amnesty; appear at public hearing; make a full confession; recognize the wrongfulness of 
the deed, in public; and acknowledge the truth. The crime is condemned legally and 
publicly and the report published with parties named. In this case, the full disclosure of a 
violation by the criminal replaces the need for punishment.60 On the other hand, victims 
are also given opportunity to come forward in public and tell their stories in front of 
officials. These two aspects of truth telling and acknowledgment are said to be very 
crucial in the reconciliation and healing process. 
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This achieved two goals: providing victims with a soft place to deal with hard 
issues, and proving perpetrators with a hard place to receive soft results.61
Although the form of justice is in essence restorative, it contains some elements of 
retributive justice in that truth is told, lies are exposed, and the perpetrators are publicly 
identified. Truth commissions presume that telling and hearing the truth is healing. Tina 
Rosenberg, a journalist immersed in the subject of collective violence in Latin America, 
Eastern Europe, and South Africa, finds parallels between truth commissions and the 
therapeutic process that helps individual victims deal with post-traumatic stress 
disorder.62 Similarly, Richard Mollica explains, “the trauma story is transformed through 
testimony from a story telling about shame and humiliation to a portrayal of dignity and 
virtue, regaining lost selves and lost worlds.”63
While, the TRC process had been conceived to come to terms with the past 
through the national reconciliation, it has been widely criticized as being a total failure, 
and of missing a vision from the beginning. The TRC was conceptualized and legalized 
at a time when there was still significant concern about cementing the transition to 
democracy and facilitating peaceful relations between national political parties. The TRC 
did not take a proper approach of reconciliation. Instead of favoring a bottom-up 
approach that favors local communities’ initiatives and inputs, the TRC adopted a top-
down approach that dictates from above. This approach has criticized as “ being at odds 
with the perceptions of reconciliation in many local communities, where local 
complexities were seen as factors that have to be addressed in their own right ”64. The 
community members perceived the TRC as not showing sufficient interest in local 
dynamics. The TRC was further criticized for having failed to reach ‘real victims’ as Van 
der Merwe puts it: “Reconciliation is not about important individuals, but the common 
people need to reconcile. Prominent people were approached to make statements. 
Thousands of people who still have birdshots pellets lodged in their skin abound in 
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Duduza.”65  He further argues that the approach to reconciliation is vague and lacks 
coherent vision of where it is taking people and is characterized by a poor out-reach 
strategy of communicating and involving the community. The communities need to be 
engaged in creating their own agenda for reconciliation and designing processes that 
allow local stakeholders to drive the process.  Otherwise, failing to provide justice to 
people would be creating a ‘time bomb’ situation. 
G. THE CASE OF SIERRA LEONE 
In June 2000, the President of Sierra Leone officially requested the assistance of 
the United Nations to try those responsible for crimes against the people of Sierra Leone 
and for the taking of United Nations peacekeepers as hostages.66  An agreement 
instituting a special Court was signed in April 2002 between the United Nations and the 
Government of Sierra Leone; and the said court started officially operating on 1July 
2002. This court was established as a hybrid body, meaning that it is part international 
and part national, combining local and international judges. The court is based in Sierra 
Leone, has primacy over Sierra Leone national courts and is independent from any 
government. The special court function is to try those who bear the greatest responsibility 
for prosecuting serious violations of international humanitarian law and the laws of Sierra 
Leone.67 In March 2003, eight indictments were issued. On 22 February 2000 the 
Parliament of Sierra Leone also adopted a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). 
Although it is a national institution, the TRC has an international dimension due to the 
participation of the Special Representative of the Secretary General and the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in its establishment.  
These two United Nations Staff were responsible for recommending the 
appointment of the three members of the commission who are not citizens of Sierra 
Leone. Furthermore, the Commission’s mandate has both fact-finding and therapeutic 
dimensions. Though the TRC and the Special Court are now operational, their objectives 
are far from being achieved. This last section will look at possible obstacles that are 
hindering the success of these two projects.  
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1. The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
A series of interviews the International Crisis Group (ICG) conducted in Sierra 
Leone in 2002 and 2003, revealed that there was a concern about whether the limited 
mandate of the court will allow those most responsible for crimes to be charged.68The 
Court’s prosecutor, an American citizen, intended to indict a maximum of 30 persons 
whom he deemed bore the greatest responsibility.69 Many Sierra Leonians argue that 
trying only the top commanders will not produce sufficient justice. To them, the most 
important are those lower ranking officials and foot soldiers whom they saw committing 
the atrocities. 
Another complication is lack of security, which does not allow the Court to make 
a more direct and long last impact on the society where the atrocities took place. The 
proceedings are conducted behind closed doors, so the population remains uninformed 
about its actions. According to an opinion poll conducted by the Sierra Leone 
organization Campaign for Good Governance, ten percent of the population voiced their 
understanding of the court’s purpose, forty-three percent expressed no understanding 
whatsoever, and 68 percent did not know the difference between the Special Court and 
the TRC.70 Information on court proceedings reaches very few people, especially 
residents of towns, and is virtually non-existent in provinces where eighty per cent of 
people are illiterate.71 Moreover, funding is scarce, resulting in the court dependence on 
external donors to operate. 
2. Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Several factors that limited TRC chances of success included a limited time 
mandate of fifteen months, under funding, tensions between national and international 
members, and, above all, lack of political will. For those reasons the TRC in Sierra Leone 
has slim chances of succeeding. Like in the case of the Special Court, the population was 
ignorant of the TRC. For example interviews conducted by ICG found a large portion of 
the population believed wrongly that they would be paid if they testified to the 
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commission. Many expressed doubt about the need for a TRC, believing that Sierra 
Leoneans could simply forgive and forget, while others felt the TRC had no power to 
compel and punish, and therefore would serve no purpose.72  Another problem is lack of 
incentives to entice the perpetrators to testify. Unlike its South African predecessor, the 
Sierra Leone TRC has no power to grant amnesty. 
In sum, for the TRC to achieve its objectives, the Government needs to step in, 
control and own the project. Both the TRC and the Special Court have not made any 
significant progress in providing justice to Sierra Leoneans. The country has failed to 
avail and guarantee conducive and necessary conditions such as security; to the enable 
the processes of justice and reconciliation take place. In fact, if the government of Sierra 
Leone does not produce extra effort to maximize achievements in coordinating the two 
projects (TRC and Special Court), the latter would be bound to failure. 
Furthermore, the local communities have to be involved in the formulation of 
policies and be informed of the progress and plans, otherwise the two institutions will 
make little to no impact on a Sierra Leonean war-torn society. However, these two 
enterprises have great potentials to initiate and achieve reconciliation. The fact that they 
mix prosecutions and therapeutic dimensions, give them greater chances to achieve 
healing and reconciliation.  
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IV. POST-WAR JUSTICE IN RWANDA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of genocide in Rwanda, justice does not present a good balance 
sheet especially as viewed by Rwandans at large.  The carefully planned genocide of the 
Tutsi community by Hutu officials and their supporters has left a traumatized population, 
a demolished physical infrastructure, local courts overwhelmed by the sheer number of 
cases to prosecute, prisons full beyond normal capacity, and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), that has failed to perform up to the expectations of both the 
international and Rwandan communities. This chapter analyzes the challenges of the 
Rwandan post-war justice system in the wake of the 1994 genocide by discussing the lack 
of prosecution of those accused of crimes against humanity and/or genocide.  It also 
dissects the problems related to the incarceration of the accused and the sluggish justice 
process currently operating in the Rwandan courts.  Lastly, this chapter explores the 
reasoning that supports the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR). 
B. THE CHALLENGES OF POST-WAR JUSTICE IN RWANDA 
1. Overview of the Rwandan Justice System 
After the horrors of the 1994 genocide in which over one million Rwandans were 
slaughtered, it was nearly impossible for the criminal justice system to cope with the 
sheer volume and complexities of such an ethnic cleansing. As a result of the civil war, 
genocide, and resulting exodus, few legal professionals of any kind remained in the 
country. Some fled, others died, and a percentage were even in prison, accused of leading 
or taking part directly in the violence or planning and setting events in motion. For 
instance, in late 1994, Rwandan Ministry of Justice Reports indicate that there were only 
36 judges and 14 prosecutors available in the entire country. In and around Kigali (the 
capital city), only two government prosecutors were operating in that period.73  Another 
report, produced by the World Bank in 1995, indicates that out of an estimated corps of 
1,100 magistrates before the war, less than 200 magistrates had reported for duty after 
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order had been restored in the country.  The judiciary infrastructure was also seriously 
affected. The Ministry of Justice had been severely damaged and looted of all its basic 
office supplies. The few investigators remaining also did not possess a single government 
vehicle for transportation in order to conduct their investigations and document evidence. 
To complicate matters even further, the Rwandan prisons, built to accommodate 
relatively few numbers, were filled well beyond capacity. For example, the central prison 
in Kigali, initially designed for a maximum capacity of 1,500 prisoners, housed more 
than 5,000 in November 1994; and this situation was repeated throughout the country.  
Thousands of suspects of the 1994 massacres were being processed into prisons 
everyday. Amnesty International reported that, by the end of 1994, 92,000 people were 
detained, a figure that had swelled to reach 125,000 by the end of 1996. Many of them 
had not been officially charged with a crime and all were without a set trial date.74  Farah 
Stockman commented that Rwanda had the densest prison population in the world.75   
At that time, the government of Rwanda faced tough internal challenges. The 
number of prisoners was increasing while limited investigative resources were minimal, 
reducing the speed of the justice process to a crawl. Among the 4,623 genocide suspects 
in Kigali prison, only 1,224 suspects had appeared before the magistrate in 1994. As 
Farah Stockman, renowned jurist contends, “at the current rate, it would take 150 years 
for the government of Rwanda to judge all the genocide suspects now in custody.”76  
While these internal challenges were mounting, international opinion also criticized the 
slow rate of prosecutions and the deteriorating conditions in prisons. The international 
community offered a few solutions to the government of Rwanda, but not a single 
suggestion was compatible with Rwandan principles and objectives. For instance, France 
offered to sponsor judges from the francophone countries to come and speed up the 
process of the genocide trials. However, the Rwandan government rejected this offer on 
the grounds of sovereignty issues. It argued that outsiders could not properly adjudicate 
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the matter. When France was asked to provide funding to improve the conditions of the 
existing Rwandan prisons and for the construction of new prisons, the French 
government declined. 
Soon after Rwanda was stabilized in 1994, the Ministry of Justice undertook the 
training of new magistrates and investigators to fill the vast shortfall. The pace was slow.  
In 1997, for example, 80-90% of the magistrates’ positions were still vacant despite the 
1994 training initiative, a staggering deficit when compared to the sheer number of 
potential cases awaiting trial. After extensive deliberation and input from a number of 
national experts and expatriates, the Rwandan government enacted legislation in 1996 to 
expedite the judicial process.77 Known as the Organic Law Number 08/96 for the 
Organization and Regulation of the Prosecution of Genocide related Cases, this law 
created four levels of culpability for the genocide and crimes against humanity: 
• The planners and leaders of the genocide, those in positions of authority 
who fostered these crimes, particularly notorious killers and sexual 
torturers. 
• Others who killed. 
• Those who committed other crimes against persons. 
• Those who committed offenses against property. 
All those in the first category were subject to full prosecution and punishment.  
The law created incentives for people in the two most numerous categories (2 and 3), 
who voluntarily came forward and confessed.  The aim was to lighten some of the burden 
of preparing cases for prosecutors and investigators, thus making the number of 
remaining cases for prosecution more manageable. These incentives will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter V, as well as some of the amendments made on this law.   
As a consequence of this legislation, the International Crisis Group (ICG) did 
report that the number of domestic genocide trials rose from 330 in 1997 to 600 in 199878 
and they continued to rise steadily. From December 1996 to November 1998, those who 
had pleaded guilty to genocide and other human rights abuses numbered almost 10,000,  
 
77 This organic law can be found in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, year 40, no. 6, 
(March 2001), 34. 
78 “Five Years after the Genocide in Rwanda: Justice in Question,” (ICG Report Rwanda No. 1, 7 
April 1999), 4. 
36 
                                                
with  only 2,000  coming to trial in  the same period. By January 2000, more than 2,500 
people had been tried.79 Looking at these figures of tried cases, in comparison to those 
awaiting trials in prison, one might not appreciate government efforts to deal with this 
enormous challenge. However by way of comparison, the Nuremberg trials, supported by 
over 900 allied personnel and about the equal number of Germans, hardly prosecuted 200 
defendants. To put these numbers in perspective, Mr. Neil Kritz comments that the 
prospect of 100,000 genocide defendants unquestionably would overwhelm and 
incapacitate any developed including the United States, which has half a million lawyers, 
and an economy and population that are vastly larger than that of tiny Rwanda.80   
Rwanda had the additional responsibility of upgrading all aspects of its national 
institutions. The desperate state of Rwandan security, economy, agriculture, health, 
resettlement, and education, all of which required similar attention, made it difficult to 
concentrate exclusively or even primarily on justice issues. As a consequence, pressure 
mounted from the survivors of genocide who claimed that the government was dragging 
its feet. The international community also complained that prisoners continued to 
languish in prisons. 
In an effort to deal with this justice backlog, the Rwandan Government carried out 
group trials. This required the creation of chambers in all twelve Rwandan    provinces to 
expedite concurrent trials. Once again, it became clear that the 12 tribunals were 
insufficient to contend with the backlog of approximately 125,000 suspects and related 
trials. 
In another attempt to reduce the backlog of the cases, the government passed a 
law in September 1996 stipulating that all arrested genocide suspects must have their files 
and testimonies in order by December 1997. The law also fixed the legal period of 
detention at six months. Furthermore, in August 1997, the Rwandan government decided 
to discharge those genocide suspects who had incurable disease (e.g., AIDS), or who 
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were elderly or minors during the genocide.  In 1998, a second controversial decision of 
the Ministry of Justice released nearly 10,000 genocide suspects who did not have fully 
prepared case files. 
However, this gesture toward leniency was frequently criticized. Some suggested 
that this policy was part of a government effort to win votes in the upcoming elections, as 
well as an attempt to deflect criticism from the international community. The survivors’ 
association IBUKA was most critical. It expressed disappointment concerning the judicial 
institutions arguing that such measures were not helping to eradicate the culture of 
impunity but rather reinforcing it. The fact that certain suspects did not have up- to- date 
case files hardly constituted grounds for release and their making make those suspects 
innocent. 
The aftermath of the Rwandan genocide presented further tough choices and 
offered very limited acceptable options to the government in its attempt reconcile 
Rwanda’s future with its past.  This is seen in its effort to rebuild the justice system in 
order to create conditions for social development and harmony while at the same time,  
confronting the appalling poverty of the population and  the country’s lack of financial 
means. The challenge of reconstructing the justice system while dealing with thousands 
of case files for genocide suspects was enormous, even for countries with robust justice 
systems with resources. Added to this, was Rwanda’s overall state of destruction. 
According to Mr. Charles Mironko, the dilemma, therefore, lies in reconciling the 
unspeakable situation of the genocide suspects (mostly Hutu) in prisons and the demands 
of survivors and the legacy of up to one million victims (mostly Tutsi) tortured, killed, 
raped robbed, and humiliated by the very same prisoners.81  
2. The Establishment of International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda 
(ICTR) 
When the 1994 genocide in Rwanda was stopped, it left the country with a 
shattered judiciary system that had the responsibility of dealing with the huge challenge 
of trying those who committed the atrocities. To make matters worse, the majority of 
senior planners and perpetrators had fled the country and, hence, were beyond 
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apprehension and prosecution by the Rwandan authorities. Consequently, many believed 
that only an international tribunal possessed the necessary human and material resources 
at its disposal to provide justice in the complex and vast Rwandan legal situation.  An 
international tribunal also stood a better chance than did local courts in securing the 
physical custody and extradition of those suspects abroad. On November 8, 1994, having 
determined that the genocide and other systematic, widespread, and flagrant violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda constituted a threat to international 
peace and security within the scope of Chapter VII of the United Nations (UN) Charter, 
the Security Council adopted Resolution 955.  This supplied the legal foundation for the 
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and other 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law committed in the territory of 
Rwanda, those responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the 
territory of neighboring states, between January 1, and December 31, 199482.  This 
section assesses whether or not the ICTR has attained its objectives since its genesis by 
reviewing the achievements, shortcomings and future prospects of this tribunal.  
3. The ICTR 
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reluctantly passed a resolution 
establishing the ICTR on November 8, 1994, as requested by the Government of Rwanda. 
However, the passing of this resolution was a near-run thing. Debate revolved around 
whether the murderous acts in Rwanda were really genocide, or simply widespread 
indiscriminate behavior of sub-genocidal massacres holding lesser connotations. Given 
the reluctance to intervene that characterized the behavior of international community 
during the massacres, it was clear that, had the sequence of events between the Yugoslav 
and Rwanda conflicts been different, it is by no means certain that a tribunal for Rwanda 
would have been established.  
On the basis of international responses to other situations, it has been 
suggested that the plight of African victims would not have generated the 
same outcry as the suffering of Europeans. In other words, the ICTR was 
established because of the precedential effect of the Yugoslav Tribunal.  
 




                                                
Others have suggested that it is the miasma of guilt, of having failed to 
intervene before and during genocide in Rwanda that hovered over 
Western governments to vote for the creation of the ICTR.83  
During the UN deliberations to establish the ICTR, the UNSC considered three 
options: 
• Expansion of the mandate of the existing tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia to include Rwanda. 
• Creation of a wholly separate entity under UN auspices, with its own 
charter, judges, personnel, facilities, etc. 
• Creation of a separate Rwanda tribunal, but sharing an administrative 
staff, facilities, and other resources with the Yugoslavia panel. 
A combination of the three possibilities was adopted. The ICTR was established 
as an independent entity, with its own judges, registry system, and administrative staff. 
However, the same persons who served as Chief Prosecutor and appeals judges for the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) would execute those functions for 
the Rwanda Tribunal. The ICTR would adopt the rules of evidence and procedure that 
were developed for the ICTY. Although the intentions were good, this kind of 
arrangement based on concessions was bound to create problems and contradictions, as 
Professor M.C. Bassiouni notes:  
The choice of a single Prosecutor was particularly ill advised because no 
person, no matter how talented, can oversee two major sets of 
prosecutions separated by 10,000 miles. The idea that one can shuttle 
between The Hague, Netherlands and Arusha, Tanzania as part of normal 
work schedule is nothing short of absurd.84
It is worthwhile noting that the Rwandan government, having championed the 
establishment of the ICTR, eventually voted against Resolution 955.85  Rwanda initially 
had envisaged that the Tribunal would be under its national jurisdiction, thereby giving 
the government sovereign protection and avoiding manipulations by States with ties to  
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the previous regime. Rwandan government dissatisfaction and the dissatisfaction with the 
Resolution and the Tribunal’s Statute, ultimately came to be based on the following 
reasons: 
• The Rwandan Government was of the view that the temporal jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal was too restrictive, i.e., Covering only the period between 
January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994. The argument was that the 
genocidal acts committed in 1994 had not occurred spontaneously but had 
been preceded by pilot projects for extermination dating from the 
beginning of the armed conflict in October 1990.86 The argument 
elaborated that an international tribunal, which refused to consider the 
causes of genocide in Rwanda and its planning, could not be of any use 
because it would not contribute to eradicating the culture of impunity or 
creating a climate conducive to the national reconciliation.87 
• The Rwandan Government deemed that the composition and structure of 
the Tribunal was inappropriate and ineffective, given the magnitude of the 
task awaiting the staff of the Tribunal and the need for speedy and 
exemplary action by the Tribunal. The Rwandan Government had 
requested that the number of Trial Chamber judges be increased, and that 
the Tribunal be given its own Appeal Chamber and prosecutor (instead of 
sharing with Yugoslavia).  
• The Rwandan Government believed that certain countries had proposed 
candidates for judges, and at the same time, they had participated in their 
election despite the fact that the countries took a very active role in the 
politics of intervention that surrounded the genocide in Rwanda. 
• The Rwandan Government was opposed to imprisoning those condemned 
outside Rwanda and giving other countries the authority to reach decisions 
about the detainees. It argued that this authority should remain with the 
International Tribunal, if not with the Rwandan Government, to avoid a 
situation in which the perpetrators would be freed. 
• The Rwandan Government objected to omission of the death penalty, 
which is provided for in the Rwandan penal code. 
• The Rwandan Government argued that, in order for the Tribunal to 
achieve the desired effect of “teaching the Rwandan people a lesson, to 
fight against the impunity to which it had become accustomed … and to 
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promote national reconciliation,”88 the Tribunal’s seat should be located in 
Rwanda unlike in the former Yugoslavia where the location of the 
Tribunal’s seat was not an option because the war was still raging and the 
insecurity would not allow it to operate. Despite the fact that the war had 
been over for approximately four months ago, some argued that in 
addition to the dilapidated infrastructure, “…it would be difficult for the 
UN staff to operate in the early throes of clearing the dead…”89 This 
decision reflected poorly on a so-called humanitarian organization, which, 
after abandoning people to be slaughtered, refused to operate in areas of 
the country infused with the stench of decaying bodies. 
In addition, Rwanda’s social, cultural and political environment was not taken 
into consideration when the ICTR was planned and established.  The result, therefore, did 
not completely address Rwanda’s circumstances. Furthermore, tribunals organized under 
separate auspices threatened to produce contradictions in international law. Rwanda and 
Yugoslavia offered the two cases, since the post-World War II war crime trials in 
Nuremberg and Tokyo, in which such an international tribunal was currently functioning. 
As was true of the earlier proceedings, the tribunal’s interpretation and application of 
evolving international norms would affect this field for years to come. Wholly separate 
tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda could well arrive at conflicting interpretations of 
these international norms, putting them in contradiction and undercutting their credibility. 
Rather than clarifying and strengthening international standards, the result of “dueling” 
tribunals could add confusion to an area of law that was already somewhat uncertain and 
lacking in precedence. On the other hand, use of a single appeals chamber for both 
tribunals would ensure that these evolving international norms would be interpreted and 
applied consistently by both of these bodies. 
Potential procedural contradictions of a dual tribunal system were also 
problematic. Aside from generating inconsistencies in substantive international law, 
completely separate tribunals would potentially develop two dissimilar coordination 
mechanisms of investigations, rules of procedure, and standards of evidence.  These 
disparities would raise questions of fairness and possibly negative comparisons between 
the tribunal established for a European case and one created with an African focus. It is 
 
88 “UN Doc. S/PV.3453,” from 16 (1994). Available from 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N94/869/74/PDF/N9486974.pdf?OpenElement, Accessed 
March 2005. 
89 Kirtz, 131. 
42 
                                                
however, important to note that the Statute of ICTR sought to eliminate procedural 
dissonances. It stipulated that the judges of ICTR shall adopt rules of procedure and 
evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of proceedings, trials and appeals, the 
admission of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate 
matters of ICTR with changes as they deem necessary. 
The ICTR and Rwandan courts were given concurrent jurisdiction. This was 
necessary to determine where each would place its emphasis. The ICTR would follow the 
precedent set by the Nuremberg trials, hearing cases against a smaller number of 
principals responsible for the genocide. It would focus on senior leaders of the former 
government, military, and militias, and representatives of other segments of Rwandan 
society implicated in atrocities, such as the clergy. 
Prosecutions before domestic courts, on the other hand, would enhance the 
legitimacy of the Rwandan government and of the judiciary, be more sensitive to nuances 
of local community, emphasize that Rwanda society would henceforth hold individuals 
accountable for their crimes, and stress a local alternative to vigilante justice. A key 
purpose of the UN Tribunal as described by the Commission of Experts is unquestionably 
the “coherent development of international criminal law to better deter such crimes from 
being perpetrated in future not only in Rwanda but anywhere.”90 More immediately, 
however, the tribunal was to provide Rwandans with a message and a visible image that 
justice is being accomplished, and that the atrocities in Rwanda are being addressed 
within the framework of the law. This public display through the trials was vital to 
exorcise the long-entrenched culture of impunity, achieve a degree of reconciliation, stem 
vigilante acts of retribution, facilitate a return of refugees, and deter a new wave of 
violence. However, the position of the tribunal undermined these objectives. Nor has it 
had a public impact on the people of Rwanda, as did the Nuremberg trials in Germany, as 
detailed below. 
4. Achievements 
Despite the long list of limitations associated with the ICTR, there have been 
some notable advancement in addressing some of the many concerns. These include: 
 
90 Eric David, Pierre Klein and Rosa Anne-Marie Law, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
Reports of Orders, Documents and Judgments, (Bruylant, Belgium 2000), 1063. 
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• The appointment of a separate prosecutor and ad hoc judges for the ICTR. 
The United Security Council (UNSC), in a bid to improve on the pace of 
the ICTR trials, decided to establish a separate prosecutor for the ICTR 
and also elected a panel of 18 ad hoc judges.91 (the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the ex-Yugoslavia- ICTY and the ICTR had been overseen by 
one prosecutor based in The Hague) 
• Initiatives taken by the new President of the Tribunal to expedite the pace 
of trials and to promote the effective functioning of the tribunal. In fact, 
Judge Erik Mose who was elected the new president of the ICTR in May 
2003, started four new trials, submitted a completion strategy to theUNSC 
and increased the number of ad litem judges (for a term of four years 
without reappointment rights) from four to nine.92 
• The Tribunal has apprehended a handful of high-profile suspects, which 
the Rwandan Government would not have been able to for various 
political reasons. From personal experience, many of the genocide 
suspects are hiding in countries where the Rwandan Government cannot 
access them due to a lack of extradition treaties. Other countries, which 
had close ties with the genocidal regimes, such as France, are protecting 
the suspects, making difficult, if not impossible, for the Rwandan 
Government to reach them. Hence, the hope has been on the ICTR to use 
its power under chap VII. 
• The ICTR has many other accomplishments including the first 
contemporary conviction for genocide by an international court in the case 
of Paul Akayezu and the indictment, arrest, and guilty plea of former 
Prime Minister Jean Kambanda for crimes against humanity and genocide. 
This prosecution reinvigorated the effort to bring Augusto Pinochet to 
trial. The Akayezu case contributed to the establishment of the precedent 
that the systematic commission of rape be included in the crime of 
genocide. 
5. Shortcomings of the ICTR 
The failure of the ICTR to fulfill expectations was entirely predictable. Its failures 
included: 
• The ICTR is remote and alienated from Rwandan society. It has failed to 
have any significant impact on Rwandan society as envisaged in the 
UNSC Resolution 955, which established the Tribunal. The Rwandan 
populace receives little to no information on Tribunal activities and 
accomplishments. In addition, the ICTR has failed to generate 
international press coverage of its operations.  
 
91 Document available from: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N04/407/96/PDF/N0440796.pdf?OpenElement. Accessed 
March 2005. 
92 The new president of ICTR interviewed by Hirondelle News. Available from: 
http://wwwhirondelle.org:20.01.04  Accessed March 2005. 
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• The Tribunal’s management organs have worked as unrelated institutions 
lacking cohesion rather than being complementary organs of the same 
institution working in close cooperation. The American war crimes 
Ambassador Pierre-Richard Prosper expressed disappointment over the 
court’s lack of professionalism, mismanagement, and the slow and 
slumbering pace of prosecutions.93 
• The Tribunal has under performed, especially given its high profile and 
ample resources. It has a yearly budget of roughly $100 million.94 Yet, it 
has achieved minimal results: 
• Only 19 cases have been completed, the last in December 2003. 
• There are a mere 17 detainees on trial. 
• Only 30 detainees are pending trial. 
• There are only 56 detainees in Arusha, with six serving sentences 
in Mali.95 
• The ICTR has failed to develop a credible and effective witness protection 
program, and has neglected to address other pertinent concerns and needs 
of victims and witnesses, as testified by the open letter of the Rwandan 
women’s association to the ICTR Chief Prosecutor.96 For example, Bosco 
Nyemazi, a confessed genocide killer, was murdered on October 12, 2004 
shortly after his return from testifying at the ICTR headquarters in Arusha. 
The Rwandan officials highly suspected a connection between the murder 
and the ICTR investigators.97 
• The ICTR has hired perpetrators of genocide and close relatives and 
friends of suspects as defense investigators and legal assistants, who 
allegedly threaten genocide survivors tapped as prosecution witnesses. In 
2001, three of the ICTR defense investigators who had been working 
under different names, were found to be suspects in the 1994 genocide. 
These are Augustin Basebya, Aloys Ngendahimana, and Augustin 
Karera.98 
• It has been accused by genocide survivors’ groups as being insensitive to 
the sufferings of witnesses, especially the victims of rape. In January 
2002, the survivors’ groups such as IBUKA and AVEGA (Association des 
Veuves du Genocide d’Avril: Association of April Widows), refused to 
 
93 The new president of ICTR interviewed by Hirondelle News. 
94 Ibid. 
95 ICTR Detainees, status in December 24 Report. 
96 The open letter available from http://www.dd-
rd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/women/womtrirw.html, Accessed March 2005. 
97 http://www.horondelle.org:10.11.04. Accessed March 2005. 
98 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1442432.stm. Accessed March 2004. 
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cooperate with the Tribunal, stating that their members would not testify 
before “people who ridicule us and treat our suffering as a banality.”99 
• There have been constant reports of fee-splitting arrangements between 
genocide suspects in detention and defense lawyers. One result is that 
financial contributions made by the international community to bring to 
justice the perpetrators of genocide are instead used to enrich the criminals 
and their families and friends. For example, some detainees at the ICTR 
solicit between US $2,500 to 5,000 per month from their defense teams.100 
6. Future Prospects 
The ICTR was slated to have completed investigations by 2004 and clear the 
docket by 2008. However, owing to the sluggish pace of proceedings, coupled with 
frequent and long interruptions of trials, there is little hope that this will be accomplished. 
Nevertheless, the Rwandan Government has initiated negotiations with the Tribunal in 
order to transfer all the detainees who are waiting prosecutions from Arusha to Rwanda. 
The ICTR has already finished surveying detention facilities in Rwanda with the view of 
improving their conditions. 
Those transfers of the remaining cases to Rwanda will contribute a great deal to 
boosting the national courts’ prestige and credibility. Moreover, trials conducted at the 
scene of the crimes would produce a direct positive impact on the victims of genocide in 
Rwanda. They would certainly contribute to the mental health of the victims of genocide, 
impact the Rwandan economy, and by helping to bring closure to the most horrific 
episode in the region’s history, contribute to the political stability of the Rwandan Nation.  
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has analyzed the challenges inherent in post-war justice in Rwanda.  
The main concerns include the prosecution of crimes against humanity and genocide, and 
the associated problems of incarceration and the slow pace of justice in Rwanda. This 
chapter also has analyzed the difficulties and successes of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda. Unfortunately, the ICTR, established to try the perpetrators of 
genocide, has failed adequately to its obligations to the satisfaction of Rwandans and the 
international community. In an effort to fill this void, the government of Rwanda has  
99 Amnesty International, Rwanda, Gacaca: A Question of Justice, 10. 
100 “BBC Monitoring Africa- Political.” London: March 14, 2002, 1. Available from 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=2&did=110444191&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD
&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1111129838&clientId=11969#fulltext, Accessed March 
2005. 
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established mechanisms to address the consequences of the genocide, while at the same 
time pushing the United Nations Security Council and the ICTR to establish an equitable 
solution.  It is hoped that such cooperation will help the ICTR complete its obligations 
and create a conduit so that the ICTR can eventually delegate any remaining and 
unfulfilled responsibilities to the Rwandan justice system. 
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V. THE GACACA JUSTICE SYSTEM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Courts try cases – but cases also try courts.  
Judge Robert Jackson, the Chief Prosecutor at the 
Nuremberg Tribunal.101  
The genocide-related cases taken up by the ICTR and the Rwandan national 
courts have certainly strained these traditional institutions of law and both have been 
found wanting. While the ICTR has made important strides for international humanitarian 
law, including the first conviction of rape as a war crime, in general it has not met the 
needs of the Rwandan people. The national legal system of Rwanda has also been 
overwhelmed by the sheer number of cases and so has failed adequately to administer 
justice after the genocide, hence prompting the government to resort to and modify an 
alternative justice mechanism called Gacaca. In their article, Peter Uvin and Charles 
Mironko concluded that “Gacaca may remedy the slow pace of current judicial practice, 
and also has the potential to create significant benefits in terms of truth , reconciliation, 
and even grassroots empowerment.”102 Many claim that this community-based dispute 
resolution system will bring expeditious justice, healing, and reconciliation. This chapter 
will discuss Gacaca’s adaptation to the conditions of post-genocide Rwanda. It will look 
at its strengths and weaknesses in bringing justice after the genocide of 1994.   
B. DEFINITION OF GACACA 
Gacaca is a corruption of a word for a variety of grass common in Rwanda, called 
umucaca. Long before the colonial period, the word signified both a meeting and a 
meeting place used by village elders for solving problems amicably or trying to mediate a 
conflict while sitting on Gacaca-covered ground.103 In pre-colonial Rwanda, there were 
two ways of resolving conflicts. In the first, the king ordered people to forget or avoid 
 
101 Helena Cobban, “The Legacies of Collective Violence: The Rwandan Genocide and the Limits of 
Law,” Bostonian Review. (May 2004), 8. Available from 
http://www.bostonreview.net/BR27.2/cobban.html, Accessed January 2005. 
102 Peter Uvin and Charles Mironko, “Western and Local Approaches to Justice in Rwanda,” Global 
Governance Research Library 9 (2003). 
103 Mironko, 20.  
48 
                                                
revenge between parties to a conflict, in order to preserve social unity. The second means 
was through Gacaca, traditionally used at the local level to resolve disputes. In Gacaca 
proceedings, respected community figures served as “judges” during the dispute 
resolution process. Typically, Gacaca considered disputes around inheritance, civil light, 
and conjugal matters. All cases had first to be taken to the council of elders before they 
were forwarded to the attention of the king, who only intervened to resolve the most 
difficult issues.  
The Gacaca, similar to nearly all systems of traditional law, was part of the 
Rwandan culture. It was established upon principles of morality and reverence for life. 
As such, it cannot be examined in isolation, but has to be placed in a wider context of the 
customs and organization of a society so as to understand its meaning within the context 
of practices and beliefs.104 Thus, Gacaca was a traditional system used to settle social or 
economic conflicts between one or more families usually within the same village. The 
system of family organization determined the composition of Gacaca and its modis 
operandi. The basic structure of Gacaca included a council of elders, and adult members 
of the community. 
All members of a family lineage were placed under one head of that family 
lineage. Being the most senior member (in age), the head of the family lineage was 
designated by his father before the latter’s death. The importance and powers of the head 
of family in relation to the latter were comparable to the king’s role in relation to the 
nation. The head of family served as judge, lawyer, administrator, and conflict regulator 
of his group.105 The principle behind each judgment was the restoration of social order 
and harmony rather than the imposition of punitive measures. The council of elders in 
any community was composed of heads of families, who used their authority to resolve 
disputes by rendering justice to achieve the restoration of order, the reintegration of the 
offender, and the reconciliation of the affected parties. The function of judge was sacred.  
 
104 Charles Ntampaka, “Le Gacaca Rwandais, Une Justice Repressive Participative,” Actualité du 
Droit International Humanitaire, (La Charte, 2001), 214.  
105 Ibid. 
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He acted in the name of his ancestors and of god. Moreover, these elders had coercive 
means in the unusual case where someone refused to obey the decision of Gacaca. Severe 
punishments included banning the criminal from the community.   
Gacaca denotes two features:  an active role assumed by the people to create legal 
norms, and a conciliatory dimension in the decision - making. Taking someone to Gacaca 
was the last resort in resolving conflict, since amicable resolutions were the preferred 
path. 
C. PEOPLE CREATING THEIR LAW 
The Rwandan culture was characterized by ethical traditions, meaning a system of 
moral rules, derived from people’s daily customary practice that became binding 
obligations because they were necessary to the group’s survival. As one writer notes, 
these obligations achieved authority that is equivalent to the “force of law”.106 Thus, 
unjust norms never existed for they always expressed the people’s will and the 
requirement for social cohesion and survival. 
Gacaca did not have regulations on pre-established procedures. Rather, the 
organization and procedures followed kinship structures that had no fixed venue. For 
example, a Gacaca hearing could take place in the open on the grass (umucaca), in a 
house, under a tree or anywhere else decided by the person who called Gacaca.107 Gacaca 
was much more flexible regarding the imperatives of the collective security and the 
return to social harmony, meaning that it could be tolerant in those cases that risked 
creating discord and disunity in family or society. The decision was respected not 
because it was a legally binding decision, but because it ended a disorder and allowed the 
reestablishment of a disrupted social order. 
D. THE CONCILIATORY ASPECT OF GACACA JUSTICE 
In a traditional trial, there was no winner or loser. Everybody had to feel that he 
was not only gaining, but also losing. However, the family was always the winner 
because the decision would result in reconciliation. There was always an obligation to tell 
the truth, as illustrated by the Rwandan saying/principle: “aho kuryamira ukuri 
 
106 Mark R. Amstutz, International Ethics, Concepts, Theories, and Cases in Global Politics, 
(Rowman &Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 48. 
107 Mironko, 20.  
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waryamira ubugi bw’intorezo” meaning literally that, instead of hiding the truth, one 
would rather be beheaded.108  The constant focus on finding a conciliatory judgment 
required the traditional judges to favor socialization in lieu of punishment. Most 
decisions involved affordable reparations being paid by one party to the other. To seal the 
deal, local beer was usually shared among the participants.  
Gacaca took various forms during the colonial era, in the post-independence 
movement, and through the post-genocide period. The following sections of this paper 
will focus primarily on the post-genocide Gacaca. 
E. THE POST-GENOCIDE GACACA 
The idea of modifying traditional Gacaca for the purpose of judging genocide 
crimes is an innovation of the Rwandan government. According to Michel Moussalli, a 
well-known human rights activist:  
It is the credit of the Rwandan authorities that…they do not hesitate to 
innovate and to try new approaches when it appears that the one at hand is 
not working at all or adequately. The current effort to institute gacaca 
jurisdictions alongside the conventional ones must be seen in this light.109
The first discussions of using Gacaca justice to try genocide related cases started 
in 1995. The international community and human rights groups were, however, very 
skeptical that Gacaca would fail to protect defendants’ rights. However, despair over the 
ever-increasing prison population caused by the slow pace of justice pushed the 
Government of Rwanda to explore the idea of Gacaca despite concerns. Also, the 
government managed to convince international donors towards the end of 1999 that 
Gacaca offered a solution to the problem of slow justice. 
F. STRUCTURE AND WORK OF THE GACACA COURTS 
The Rwandan Parliament passed the Organic Law 40/2000 in December, 2000, 
usually referred to as the Gacaca law. This law established nearly 11,000 Gacaca 
jurisdictions and empowered them to try genocide related suspects.  Amended in 2004, 
the new Organic law, number 16/2004 of 19 June, 2004,110 established the organization, 
competence and functioning of Gacaca courts and is charged with prosecuting and trying  
 
108 Ntampaka, 216. 
109 Villa-Vicencio, 75. 
110 The Organic Law was printed in Journal Officiel No. Special du 01/05/2004 (Rwanda), 45. 
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the perpetrators of the crime of genocide and other crimes against humanity, committed 
between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994.  These crimes of genocide are divided 
into three categories. 
1. First Category 
• The person whose criminal acts or criminal participation places him or her 
among planners, organizers, imitators, supervisors and ringleaders of the 
genocide or crime against humanity, together with his or her accomplices. 
• The person who, at that time, was in the organs of leadership, at the 
national level, at the level of Prefecture, Sub-prefecture, Commune, in 
political parties, army, gendarmerie, communal police, religious 
denominations or in militia, has committed these offenses or encouraged 
other people to commit them together with his or her accomplices. 
• The well known murderer who distinguished himself or herself in the 
location where he or she lived or wherever he or she passed, because of 
the zeal which characterized him or her in the killings or excessive 
wickedness with which they were carried out, together with his or her 
accomplices. 
• The person who committed acts of torture against others, even though they 
did not result in death, together with his or her accomplices. 
• The person who committed acts of rape or acts of torture against sexual 
organs, together with his or her accomplices. 
• The person who committed dehumanizing acts on a dead body, together 
with his or her accomplices. 
2. Second Category 
• The person whose criminal act or criminal participation place them among 
killers or who committed acts of serious attacks against others, causing 
death, together with his or her accomplices. 
• The person who injured or committed other acts of serous attacks with the 
intention to kill them, but who did not attain his or her objective, together 
with his or her accomplices. 
• The person who committed or aided in committing other offences to 
people, without the intention to kill them, together with his or her 
accomplices. 
3. Third Category 
• The person who committed offenses only against property. However, if 
the author of the offence and the victim have agreed on their own, or 
before the public authority or witnesses on an amicable settlement, he or 
she cannot be prosecuted. 
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The organic law stipulates that the Gacaca courts have jurisdiction over suspects 
in the second and third categories. The first category suspects are tried before ordinary 
courts, which apply common law content, and procedure rules subject to exceptions 
provided for by the organic law.111 The Gacaca jurisdictions are divided into three 
categories. These are: 
• The jurisdiction for the Gacaca court for the cell112 
• The jurisdiction for the Gacaca court of the sector 
• The jurisdiction of the Gacaca court of appeal in each sector 
Rwanda has approximately 9,500 cells, and above them, there are 1,550.113 
Gacaca jurisdictions consist of three main divisions at the cell and sector levels: the 
General Assembly, the Seat, and the Coordinating Committee.  At the cell level, the 
General Assembly comprises all the inhabitants aged 18 and above. This General 
Assembly elects nine persons of integrity among its members, otherwise known as 
Inyangamugayo, constituting the seat and five deputies.114 These nine persons then elect 
among themselves, with a simple majority, the coordination committee made up of a 
President, a first Vice President, a second Vice President and two secretaries, all of whom 
must know how to read and write Kinyarwanda, the national language of Rwanda. 
At the sector level, the same procedure is done twice to cater to both the Gacaca 
Court of Appeal and the Gacaca Court of the Sector.115 The following cannot be elected a 
member of the Seat for Gacaca Court: 
• A leading figure of a political party. 
• A person in charge of a centralized or decentralized government 
administration. 
• A soldier or policeman who is still on active service. 
• A career magistrate. 
• Anyone on the official list of genocide suspects. 
 
111 Journal Officiel, 34. 
112 Administratively, Rwanda is divided into provinces, the latter are sub-divided into districts, sectors 
and cells, being the smallest administrative units. 
113 Harrell E. Peter, Rwanda’s Gamble Gacaca and a New Model of Transitional Justice, (NY: 
Writers Club Press, 2003), 70. 
114 Journal Officiel, 36. 
115 Ibid. 
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In addition, a member of the seat for the Gacaca Court cannot judge or decide on 
a case in which he or she is a party or is prosecuted. Before exercising his or her duties, 
every member of the Seat for the Gacaca Court must take an oath.116 Note that these 
Gacaca courts do not replace the Rwandan formal courts or the ICTR trials. They will 
work in parallel with speed and reconciliation. 
G. INCENTIVES AND PENALTIES  
The organic law stipulates that defendants falling within the first category who 
refused to confess plead guilty, repent and apologize, or whose confessions, guilty plea, 
repentance and apologies have been rejected, incur a death penalty or life 
imprisonment.117 The same law, however, stipulates that defendants falling within the 
first category, who confessed, pleaded guilty repented and apologized, incur a prison 
sentence ranging from 25 years to 30 years of imprisonment. Second category defendants 
who refused to confess incur a prison sentence ranging from 25 to 30 years of 
imprisonment, while those who confessed get their sentence reduced from 12 to 15 years 
of imprisonment, out of which they serve half in custody while the rest is commuted into 
community services on probation. The remaining defendants with lesser crimes, who 
confessed, get sentences varying from a maximum of five years to a minimum of one 
year of imprisonment.  Half the sentence is served in custody and the rest is commuted 
into community services on probation. Moreover, defendants who committed offences 
relating to property are only sentenced to the civil reparation for that which they have 
damaged.  
H. EXPECTATIONS AND CHALLENGES  
The government of Rwanda hopes to achieve the following main objectives in 
adapting Gacaca courts for genocide trials: 
• To eradicate the culture of impunity. The government hopes that by 
involving the population in all phases of the trials (investigation, 
prosecution, deliberation…), it will be easier to implement such a system 




116 Journal Officiel, 35. 
117 Ibid., 52. 
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• To speed up genocide trials. In the absence of any alternative from 
conventional or western models, it looks to ease the backlog of the sheer 
number of prisoners. In this respect, Gacaca courts present a realistic hope 
that the backlog can be cleared by concurrently holding trials throughout 
all the cells. 
• To establish the truth of what happened during the genocide. Genocide 
was committed by the population or was committed in their presence. 
Thus, involving them is the only way to know the truth.  
• To reconstruct the Rwandan society. The participation of individuals is 
designed to build and strengthen communities as well as to empower the 
population. The Gacaca system requires people within the communities to 
work as voters, witnesses, tribunal personnel, and jurors. It creates a 
common experience in which everyone works together toward a common 
goal. This participatory process promotes national democratic and rule of 
law values, as well as it shifts from the central government to the people. 
Also, punishing the guilty, restoring the victims’ rights, and ending the 
culture of suspicion will promote morality, social cohesion and harmony 
that in turn will lay down a strong foundation for the reconstruction of 
Rwandan society. 
The anticipated participation of the Gacaca actors appears in Table 2.118









Survivors 48% 1% 1% 23% 25% 2% 
Prisoners 28% 28% 33% 9% … 2% 
Population 11% 9% 3% 44% 23% 10% 
Butare 25% 11% 0% 41% 18% 5% 
Byumba 6% 5% 0% 42% 29% 19% 
Cyangugu 12% 8% 9% 42% 18% 11% 
Gikongoro 22% 12% 1% 41% 20% 4% 
Gisenyi 14% 15% 0% 25% 33% 13% 
Gitarama 8% 12% 7% 43% 22% 8% 
Kibungo 13% 10% 1% 50% 20% 7% 
Kibuye 6% 6% 17% 36% 26% 8% 
Kigalingali 8% 8% 0% 49% 26% 9% 
MVK 6% 6% 2% 60% 11% 16% 
Ruhengeli 9% 12% 2% 39% 24% 14% 
Umutara 5% 4% 0% 61% 22% 8% 
 
                                                 
118 National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (N.U.R.C). Republic of Rwanda, Opinion Survey 
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The data in the above table is reflected in an opinion survey that was conducted in 
Rwanda from July 8 to August 12, 2002. The population numbers involved are estimated 
at more than 7 million for the general population, 400,000 survivors and 110,000 persons 
on preventive detention, on charges related to genocide and crimes against humanity. The 
survey methods and techniques are based on samples selected randomly and without 
restrictions among the population basin.119 The first column contains survivors, 
prisoners, population and all the 12 provinces that compose the territory of Rwanda. In 
addition, the following information is reflected: 
• More than half of the population does not wish to actively get involved in 
the Gacaca proceedings (44% + 10% = 54%) 
• 23% of the respondents will act as judges and will, therefore, not testify 
(during proceedings, judges cannot testify because they will be considered 
third party) 
• Only 23% of the population will actively participate in the Gacaca 
proceedings 
• The largest part of testimony will come from survivors and prisoners 
• The two provinces of MVK (the capital city) and that of Byumba have the 
high percentages as spectator and abstention. This may be due to the high 
proportion of new residents who returned after 1994 from neighboring 
countries, Europe and elsewhere. Byumba province also has less active 
participation because, being under RPF control before and during 
genocide, its population did not participate in killings. Those other 
provinces with low participation, such as Kigalingali and Kibungo, are 
those with a high number of victims during genocide. Generally, however, 
it is hard, according to the surveyors, to understand fully the reasons for 
the low participation observed during the survey. 
• Among prisoners, 100% of those who confessed will testify. However, the 
prisoners who did not confess, will not testify. Although they may not be 
necessarily guilty, it would be more useful to know the reasons why they 
did not confess in the first place. This said, the prisoners remain the main 
actors in Gacaca testimonies. 
• According to the survey, those who abstain from the Gacaca process either 
do not believe that the Gacaca will eradicate the culture of impunity, 
which according to the general opinion, led to genocide (this is mainly 
among survivors), or they fear for the security of the accused after Gacaca 
(this is mainly among the criminals’ relatives). 
 
 
119 National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (N.U.R.C). Republic of Rwanda, Opinion Survey 
On Participation in Gacaca and National Reconciliation, 4-5. 
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I. HOW DO GACACA COURTS ASSERT THEIR LEGITIMACY 
It would be a waste of time and resources if the Gacaca courts do not enjoy 
people’s credibility and confidence from the moment prosecutions start for the simple 
reason that people would simply not testify. Thus, for the Gacaca courts to gain 
legitimacy, they must portray themselves as an all communities (victims and guilt 
inclusive) centered process. All communities have to trust and support Gacaca. 
The opinion survey on participation in Gacaca and national reconciliation shows 
that the general opinion, including that of prisoners and survivors, is a unanimous (95%) 
that Gacaca will recognize the innocence of wrongly accused prisoners.120 This shows 
that prisoners, their relatives and the population, will support the proceedings. The 
population response also shows their conviction, at 90%, of the integrity of judges and of 
their commitments to search for truth and justice.121 These attitudes will enhance the 
legitimacy of Gacaca because the prosecuted and the general population will believe in 
these judges during trials.  
Elsewhere, the Gacaca courts must keep consistency, transparency and 
impartiality in order to assert their legitimacy. They have to be perceived not as justice 
providers, but as reconcilers of all the communities. 
J. HOW DO THE GACACA COURTS RECONCILE THE COMMUNITIES? 
Rwandan society was deeply affected by the 1994 genocide. The Tutsi 
communities do not know why genocide was organized against them.  Some even still do 
not know where the bodies of their families and loved ones are located so that they can be 
given a decent burial. Also however, even a percentage of the Hutu community does not 
why they killed their neighbors, friends or relatives.  
Proponents of transitional justice largely agree that a necessary requirement  for 
healing a society that has experienced mass violence is learning the truth about what 
happened. In Rwanda, all the untold truth is expected to come out during these trials 
because the killers, now prisoners who have confessed in prisons, will be brought back to 
their respective scenes of the crimes. Prisoners will tell the public who they killed, where 
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the bodies are, who were their accomplices during genocide and why they did it. Many 
are expected to ask for forgiveness (at least those who will testify). This truth, to 
survivors, may be a shock or cause another trauma. However, it will start a process of 
social healing. According to the above-mentioned survey, the question asking whether 
confessions by accused people will be a factor towards reconciliation, 95% of the 
population answered, “Yes”.122 Furthermore, the general opinion recognizes (at 100%) 
that survivors are motivated by the search for the truth and justice.123   
Survivors need to identify those who are responsible for crimes committed against 
their families, and the need to see them sentenced. To a lesser extent, the population 
thinks that survivors are motivated by the desire to reconcile themselves with others in 
the communities. Younger prisoners feel the same way. During the testimonies, survivors 
will also tell their stories in the form of prosecution, witness, or speaking in their own 
defense. Thus, they will be able to liberate themselves from being trapped in the past. The 
trauma literature suggests that “victims who are able to recount the events of their 
victimization in the context of acknowledgement and support may be able to receive the 
benefits of closure.”124  
In addition, the Gacaca courts by holding individuals accountable for their acts 
will alleviate collective guilt by differentiating between the perpetrators and innocent 
bystanders, hence promoting reconciliation. The individualizing of guilt is also crucial in 
the eradication of the dangerous perception that a whole community of Hutu is 
responsible for violence and atrocities. Thus, the success of Gacaca will enhance 
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K. WHAT CAN BE DONE TO MAXIMIZE THE POTENTIAL FOR 
GACACA SUCCESS? 
More than 10,000 Gacaca courts spread across the country will conduct 
proceedings concurrently. Some constraints need, however, to be cleared for these courts 
to be successful. Special attention must be paid to the following problems. 
First, the Gacaca courts are very expensive. They are facing financial and 
logistical constraints for the functioning of more than 10,000 Gacaca courts, including 
among others, the training of judges, transportation and communication, computers, 
furniture, papers, etc. If not adequately solved, the problems may cause long delays at a 
time that it is recognized that Gacaca’s success depends on the speed of its rulings, 
according to the principle of ‘justice delayed is justice denied’.  
Second, concerns such as ‘you cannot eat peace’ or ‘an empty stomach does not 
listen’, generally found in countries emerging from conflict, are also shared in Rwanda, 
especially within the survivors communities. Thus, poverty reduction is paramount as a 
national reconciliation ingredient. Poverty eradication would pave way for the process of 
forgiveness, making reconciliation possible and solving questions such as this widowed 
Rwandan woman’s question: “How can I forgive, when my livelihood was destroyed and 
I cannot even pay for the schooling of my children.”125 In this case and many similar 
cases, it might be very hard to think of any reconciliation before improving social 
welfare. Thus, economic prosperity would provide the well-being of the needy and 
greatly enhance the success of Gacaca. 
A third concern is security. According to the survey, half of the population 
believes that prisoners who do not confess may keep silent because they fear reprisals 
from their accomplices. Also however, 70% of those who confessed fear reprisals from 
their counterparts who did not confess.126 The same feelings are expressed for the 
security of judges and witness survivors. These concerns, if not cleared in people’s 
minds, may affect the Gacaca outcomes seriously. They may influence, for instance, the 
judges’ decisions.  
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In short, the Rwandan Government has to play a big role in removing these 
obstacles. It has probably to request international assistance in resolving the logistical and 
financial problems for the running of the Gacaca courts but also in areas of poverty 
reduction and socio-economical welfare of the citizens.  Furthermore, a show of force 
may be necessary during the proceedings in order to deter any attempts to disrupt the 
process or negatively influence people minds.  
L. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE GACACA COURTS. 
Accessibility must count among the strengths of the Gacaca courts. Their 
proceedings will be carried out in the local language, within walking distances, with 
simple procedures which do not require the services of a lawyer, and without the delays 
associated with the formal courts as observed in the preceding chapters. In most cases, 
the type of justice these courts will offer (based on reconciliation, and rehabilitation) is 
more appropriate to people living in closed-linked communities who must rely on 
continuous social and economic cooperation with their neighbors. The Gacaca courts will 
also be highly participatory, giving the survivors, the offenders and the community as a 
whole a real voice in finding a lasting solution. The fact that they implement sentences 
that do not necessarily require prison effectively reduces prison overcrowding and may 
allow prison budget allocations to be diverted towards social development purposes. This 
will allow the offender to continue to contribute to the economy and to pay compensation 
to the victims. It also prevents the economic and social dislocation of the family. The 
expenses of Rwanda’s prisons cost the government more than USD $20 million per 
year.127 Finally, Gacaca courts revive traditional forms of dispensing justice based on 
Rwandan culture. 
However, there have been some critics of the Gacaca process. Human rights 
organizations and legal observers have been particularly vocal in their criticisms of a 
system that does not incorporate the international standards of fair trials. These same 
critics argue that in Gacaca trials, the accused do not have lawyers, that the population 
will at the same time be both complainant and judge. While these preoccupations would 
make sense in the traditional form of justice, they are not justified in the case of Gacaca. 
Defendants do not need lawyers, because the communities are the lawyers.  
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Some Rwandans have also expressed skepticism towards the Gacaca process. 
Janvier Mbonishimana, a taxi driver who lost his parents, three brothers and a sister, sees 
the Gacaca courts as useful for genocide suspects, but not for anybody else. He argues 
that the genocide suspects are lucky because they are going to be freed.128 Others oppose 
the Gacaca system, which they know will certainly return the killers to the villages where 
the survivors, in most cases widows and children, are desperately poor and fearful. 
Alphonsine Uwimana, a victim, explains:  
Put yourself in our place, someone raped you, and then you see him come 
back, a free man. Understand our fears, suppose one day he is drunk or 
you have a confrontation in public, then he starts bragging that he raped 
you, what then?129  
These are normal reactions of people who experienced a high degree of suffering 
and trauma during genocide. However, those feared confrontations may or may not 
happen, and are certainly not sufficient grounds to abandon the process. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has argued that in pre-colonial time, Rwandans constituted three 
homogenous groups of people – Hutu, Tutsi and Twa - who shared the same culture and 
lived in harmony. There was no evidence of war or violence of any kind reported during 
their coexistence. As the writer Peter Uvin states: “They spoke the same language, they 
believed in the same god, shared the same culture, belonged to the same clans, and lived 
side by side throughout the country.”130 However, the colonialists, in their search to 
ensure their domination, broke this homogeneity through the ‘divide and rule policy’. The 
colonialists suppressed the mobility that existed between classes inherent to the Rwandan 
culture and established distinct and permanent ethnic groups.  During the post-
independence era until the genocide, these distinctions were codified and institutionalized 
and created the conditions that led to the 1994 genocide, an event that left the country 
devastated. 
Drawing on Nuremberg and Tokyo case studies, this thesis demonstrated that 
trials are necessary to stabilize the post-war situation. As one author stated, unless crimes 
are “ investigated and punished, there can be no real growth of trust, no implanting of 
democratic norms in society at large, and therefore no genuine consolidation of 
democracy.”131 However, at the time of the post-World War II trials, many criticisms 
were leveled. Some argued that they wrongly prosecuted individuals for acts of state. 
Others advanced the “victor’s justice” and “moral equivalency” arguments that the 
tribunals neglected, for example, to prosecute the allies for bombing Dresden, Hiroshima, 
Nagasaki or anyone from the Soviet Union for conduct that equaled in barbarity that of 
the Nazis. In short, many, like the then Chief Justice Stone of the United States Supreme 
Court, labeled the trial as a “high class lynching party.”132  However, for many others 
including the Germans themselves, the trials at Nuremberg began a process of 
transformation. The association of that place and the crimes symbolized how justice can 
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transform horror into hope. Other positive critics argued that, considering the atmosphere 
of the time of trials, “the deliberations associated with the Nuremberg trial may well have 
forestalled a bloodbath.”133 This was possible given the atrocities committed by the 
Germans, not only to the Jews, but also to the populations of occupied Europe.  Hence, 
the legal process served as a barrier to direct action, most likely vengeance. On the one 
hand, this thesis has shown that in South Africa, the TRC was conceptualized and 
legalized at a time when there was still significant concern about cementing the transition 
to democracy and facilitating peaceful relations between political parties. Thus, critics 
say that the TRC enterprise was flawed in its basic design and in its definition of the 
reconciliation. The dispute focuses on the approach. Some argue that the TRC was a top-
down approach to reconciliation, meaning that it was imposed and hence failed to allow 
local dynamics to play out. In contrast, the proponents of bottom-up approach to 
reconciliation argue that the latter sees society as the sum of its parts, or in terms of a 
healthy society requiring healthy individuals. Hence, national reconciliation is not 
possible without local reconciliation. People need to be guided and supported at the 
national level but not controlled from there. When there is no strong support at all from 
the state, the whole enterprise is likely to fail, as in the Liberian case. 
The government of Rwanda faced extremely challenging situations during the 
post-genocide era. Given a devastated infrastructure, and a total lack of human and 
financial resources, all local initiatives to resolve the incarceration problem yielded 
unsatisfactory results. For example, out of the entire government budget for the year 
2002, estimated at $200,000,000, more than 15% flowed to prisons, courts and 
reparations.134 Even if the financial resources were provided, the handicap would still 
remain in the shortage of trained staff.  It has been estimated that, at that speed, it would 
take 200 years to clear the prisons. 
On the other hand, the ICTR, with its lavish budget of around $100,000,000 per 
year, half that of the entire government of Rwanda, also failed to bring speedy justice. 
Thus, the formal justice model of the ICTR also appears incapable of providing the basis  
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for justice or reconciliation in Rwanda. The formal justice system has seriously 
compromised human rights standards, such as the right to a speedy trial and to minimal 
conditions of detention. 
The Gacaca enterprise is probably Rwanda’s laudable attempt to deal efficiently 
with the question of justice. Anchored in Rwandan cultural mechanisms, the Gacaca 
courts are expected not only to speed up the trials, but also to initiate, implement, and 
reinforce the process of national reconciliation. The survey showed that the majority of 
prisoners and a good percentage of the population are ready to participate in the Gacaca 
proceedings. 
Gacaca is still a project. Hearings are slated to start sometime between March and 
April of 2005. However, research shows that it presents a better alternative than the two 
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